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INTRODUCTION
Virgil is known for saying "the greatest wealth is health."' Based
on the astronomical amount spent on healthcare, the United States has
taken his idea literally-spending more "wealth" will lead to greater
"health." In 2006, the United States spent over seven thousand dollars
per person annually on healthcare.2 While that number may not seem
very high to spend on an individual level, the total amounted to
approximately 2.1 trillion dollars in 2006.3 In 2014, that number hit
three trillion, or seventeen percent of the country's Gross Domestic
Product ("GDP"). 4 One justification for spending nearly one-fifth of the
United States GDP on healthcare5 is that high quality health outcomes
will result.6 However, this causal leap depends on the assumption that
spending more money on healthcare automatically leads to high
quality, which is simply not the case.7
The traditional payment model in the United States for
healthcare services is a fee-for-service model, where physicians and
other healthcare providers are reimbursed based on the quantity of
healthcare services delivered.8 Physicians are financially rewarded
based on high quantity, not high quality, and are incentivized to deliver
as many services as possible. 9 As a result, healthcare innovators focused
1. See The Greatest Wealth Is Health, U.N. ENVTL. PROGRAMME, http://www.unep.org/
stories/WorldHealthDay/The-Greatest-Wealth-Health.asp (last visited Oct. 11, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/8XBF-2KUF] (attributing the phrase "the greatest wealth is health" to the
Roman poet Virgil).
2. Aaron Catlin et al., National Health Spending in 2006: A Year of Change for Prescription
Drugs, 27 HEALTH AFF. 14, 14 (2008).
3. Id.
4. See National Health Expenditures 2014 Highlights, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS. (2014), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/statistics-trends-and-
reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VPU-JWF6]
(stating healthcare spending in the United States reached three trillion dollars in 2014).
5. Id.; see also Health Care Costs to Reach Nearly One-Fifth of GDP by 2021, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS: KHN MORNING BRIEFING (June 13, 2012), http://khn.org/morning-breakout/
health-care-costs-4/ [https://perma.cc/7N5X-MP8H].
6. See David Auerbach & Arthur Kellermann, A Decade of Health Care Cost Growth Has
Wiped Out Real Income Gains for An Average U.S. Family, 30 HEALTH AFF. 1630, 1633-34 (2011)
(discussing whether rising costs have been accompanied by an increase in the value of healthcare).
7. See Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, Medicare Spending, the Physician
Workforce, and Beneficiaries' Quality of Care, HEALTH AFF. W4-184, W4-184 (Apr. 7, 2004),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/04/07/hlthaff.w4.184.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M6AV-UAYL] (finding that "states with higher Medicare spending have lower-quality care").
8. Steven M. Lieberman & John M. Bertko, Building Regulatory and Operational Flexibility
into Accountable Care Organizations and 'Shared Savings', 30 HEALTH AFF. 23, 24 (2011).
9. See id. (arguing that under a fee-for-service model, providers are rewarded for
performing a higher quantity of more expensive services).
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on creating integrated healthcare delivery systems 0 to align financial
incentives with cost containment and improved quality." This Note
focuses on Accountable Care Organizations ("ACOs"), specifically
Medicare Shared Savings Program ("MSSP") ACOs, 12 one of the
healthcare delivery innovations introduced and endorsed by the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") enacted in 2010.13 The
Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") defines ACOs as
"groups of doctors, hospitals, and other healthcare providers, who come
together voluntarily to give coordinated high quality care." 1 4 An ACO is
a legal entity accountable for the management and care coordination of
a defined group of patients 15 and for delivering that care in an effective
and efficient manner. 16
Although increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of
healthcare is a worthy goal, the design of integrated systems is
inherently at odds with the fraud and abuse laws that currently
regulate the healthcare industry. 17 In the healthcare context, fraud and
10. See LEIYEU SHI & DOUGLAS A. SINGH, ESSENTIALS OF THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 7
(2015) (defining an integrated delivery system as "a network of health care providers and
organizations that provides or arranges to provide a coordinated continuum of services to a defined
population and is willing to be held clinically and fiscally accountable for the clinical outcomes and
health status of the population served"); Michael E. Porter, What Is Value in Health Care?, NEW
ENG. J. MED. (Dec. 23, 2010), http://www.nejm.org/doilfull/10.1056/NEJMpl011024?viewType=
Print [https://perma.cc/3DGN-S9BL] (describing healthcare delivery as "involv[ing] numerous
organizational units, ranging from hospitals to physicians' practices to units providing single
services").
11. See Donald Berwick, The Triple Aim: Care, Health, and Cost, 27 HEALTH AFF. 759, 761-
62 (2008) (giving examples of innovations such as the primary care medical home, "Minute
Clinics," and hospitals using "lean production").
12. For the purposes of this Note, "ACO" refers only to MSSP ACOs.
13. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). For the purposes
of this Note, only Medicare ACOs and Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Shared Savings
Programs will be discussed. Section 3022 of the ACA created the MSSP for ACOs by amending
Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395, to include section 1899, "Shared Savings
Program." Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted).
14. Accountable Care Organizations (ACO), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/ (last visited Nov. 17,
2015) [https://perma.cc/9UGR-VXC4].
15. For the purposes of this Note, the words "beneficiary" and "patient" will be used
interchangeably. By statutory definition, beneficiary "means an individual who is eligible to
receive items or services for which payment may be made under a federal health care program but
does not include a provider, supplier or practitioner." 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(5) (2012).
16. Kelly Devers & Robert Berenson, Can Accountable Care Organizations Improve the Value
of Health Care by Solving the Cost and Quality Quandaries?, URB. INST. 1-2 (Oct. 2009),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/411975-Can-Accountable-Care-
Organizations-Improve-the-Value-of-Health-Care-by-Solving-the-Cost-and- Quality-Quandaries-
.PDF [https://perma.cc/J4QK-YHWR].
17. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
80 Fed. Reg. 66726, 66727 (Oct. 29, 2015) (describing initial concerns that the healthcare fraud
and abuse regulatory regime in place at the time of the development of ACOs could "impede
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abuse laws address referral or business remunerations, self-referrals,
false claims, beneficiary inducements, and relevant civil monetary
penalty provisions.18 While these laws prevent abuse under traditional
healthcare models, they can also limit efforts to coordinate care, reduce
overall costs, and improve efficiencies.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services have given
ACOs certain waivers to the healthcare fraud and abuse laws based on
the notion that the structural design of ACOs will not work without
violating these laws. 19 Affording this leniency to ACOs at such an early
stage, however, may in fact perpetuate new and different kinds of abuse
and fraud.20 While all of these waivers are discussed generally, this
Note focuses on the waiver from the prohibition on the inducement of
beneficiaries. 2 1 The waiver broadly expands the scope of permissible
inducements, despite the numerous existing exceptions to the
prohibition. 22 Broadening this scope puts patients at risk, as they are
often unaware of financial incentives motivating their providers. 23
Information asymmetry 24 between providers and patients combined
development of innovative integrated-care arrangements envisioned by the Shared Savings
Program, including shared savings arrangements and care coordination arrangements").
18. See Robert D. Stone & Kim McWhorter, Healthcare Fraud and Abuse Laws, in GHA
HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL 6 (2014), http://www.alston.com/files/docs/6threvHealthcareFraud
Abuse.pdf [https://perma.cc/J8TZ-W8WP] (providing an overview of the fraud and abuse laws that
regulate the healthcare industry).
19. See Robert G. Homchick & Sarah Fallows, ACOs: Fraud & Abuse Waivers and Analysis,
DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE, LLP, https://www.healthlawyers.org/events/programs/materials/
documents/hctl3/hhomchick.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7299-C268]
(portraying the waivers as a means to "facilitate the establishment of ACOs" because ACOs as
envisioned could not exist without violating these laws)
20. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
80 Fed. Reg. at 66739 (noting that during the notice-and-comment period before the Final ACO
Waivers were approved, commentators highlighted the fact that the beneficiary inducement
waiver may "encourage behaviors viewed as fraudulent and abusive").
21. See Civil Monetary Penalties Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2012) (beneficiary
inducement CMP); 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(f) (2012) ("The Secretary may waive such requirements of
sections 1320a-7a and 1320a-7b of this title and this subchapter as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.").
22. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
80 Fed. Reg. at 66739 (highlighting one commentator's advocacy "that ACOs should have the same
flexibility to offer inducements that is permitted under current law, which the commentor believes
will allow health care professionals not in an ACO to be on a level playing field with those in
ACOs").
23. Information asymmetry is not limited to disparities in medical knowledge. There is
widespread lack of knowledge among the general population on how healthcare is paid for and
what the existing financial incentives in place for providers are.
24. See Ake Blomgvist, The Doctor as Double Agent: Information Asymmetry, Health
Insurance, and Medical Care, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 411, 428-29 (1991) (describing the relationship
between providers and patients as characterized by information asymmetry).
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with ACO providers' ability to induce enrollees in ways other healthcare
organizations cannot is problematic. 25
This Note examines the rationale for allowing ACOs to have
such broad exemptions from fraud and abuse laws, specifically focusing
on the waiver of the prohibition on inducing beneficiaries. Part I
discusses the tumultuous healthcare space in which ACOs developed
and defines ACOs and their basic requirements. Part II examines the
traditional healthcare fraud and abuse laws and the underlying
rationale for allowing ACOs waivers from these laws, the exceptions to
the prohibition on beneficiary inducement for non-ACOs, and the
expanded scope of permissible inducements ACOs can employ under the
waiver. Part III identifies problems with affording ACOs more freedom
to use inducements more broadly. Finally, Part IV recommends that
ACOs should no longer have this waiver, and instead, ACOs should
implement shared decisionmaking initiatives, reduce information
asymmetry between patients and providers, and strategize methods to
retain patients and contain patient leakage. 26 This will create stronger
patient-provider relationships that are rooted in education, analysis,
and true change as opposed to relationships created through
inducement and shallow interactions.
I. WHAT ARE ACOs, AND WHY Do THEY MATTER?
ACOs are a key model in the current phase of healthcare
delivery and reform. The drafters of the ACA viewed ACOs as an
important experiment in healthcare innovation that could serve as an
interim model for future healthcare delivery alternatives. 27 This Part
discusses (A) the traditional healthcare system and landscape prior to
healthcare reform and the role both providers and patients have in
driving up healthcare costs, and (B) the emergence of ACOs as an
innovative healthcare delivery system.
25. 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7a(a)(5).
26. See J. Michael McWilliams et al., Outpatient Care Patterns and Organizational
Accountability in Medicare, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 938, 939 (2014) (defining "leakage of
outpatient care" as "the proportion of office visits for an ACO's assigned patients that occurs
outside of the contracting organization").
27. Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations in the Affordable Care Act, 42 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1371, 1371 (2012).
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A. Bad Incentives and a Broken System
Healthcare spending by all payerS 28 has risen in part due to the
assumption that increased spending on healthcare services produces
better care outcomes. 29 However, extensive research and analysis has
demonstrated that this is not the case. 30 In many situations, the impact
of increased spending on healthcare outcomes has been negligible and
can even result in poorer outcomes for patients, such as unnecessary
procedures and out-of-pocket expenses.31 There is no longer a consensus
that increased spending on a higher quantity of services will deliver
better quality care and outcomes. 32 Evidence of clinical variation for
treating the same diseaseS 33 across geographical regions and even
within the same cities has called into question the notion that more
services lead to better outcomes.34 Differences in the course of
treatment for the same disease across clinical settings reflect the fact
that there is no unitary standard for practicing medicine in the United
States. 35 A provider in one locale presented with a set of symptoms may
treat a patient in an entirely different manner than a provider in a
different locale. 36 Each provider is free to pursue any medically
defensible course of treatment with no accountability for the total cost
or overall quality, leading to widely different costs and quality
outcomes. 37
28. The rise in overall systemic healthcare costs reflects increased spending by all payers,
which includes the government (Medicare and Medicaid), insurance companies (third-party
payers), and individuals (if uninsured). Government and third-party payers reimburse doctors and
hospitals on a fee-for-service basis.
29. See Arnold Milstein & Helen Darling, Better U.S. Health Care at Lower Cost, 26 ISSUES
Scl. & TECH. 31, 31 (2010) ("Unsustainable growth in U.S. health care spending ... out-paced
other industrialized nations by 30% from 2000 to 2006, without evidence of a proportionally higher
health dividend.").
30. See Karen Davis et al., The Commonwealth Fund, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, 2014
Update: How the U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally (2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2014/jun/mirror-mirror
[https://perma.cc/47A9-CZNG] (finding that the United States consistently spends more than other
comparable countries on healthcare and achieves lower quality outcomes).
31. See John E. Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for
Academic Medical Centres, 325 BRITISH MED. J. 961, 963-64 (2002) (discussing how greater
healthcare expenditure results in "no better, or possibly worse, global outcomes").
32. STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE CHALLENGE OF
EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE (2010).
33. Wennberg, supra note 31, at 964.
34. See id. (suggesting greater healthcare expenditure may actually result in worse
outcomes).
35. See id. (discussing the "variation in clinical practice").
36. Id.
37. Id.
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Under the traditional healthcare system, the most common
model of reimbursement is fee-for-service. Fee-for-service payments
reimburse physicians according to the volume of services rendered,
incentivizing physicians to exponentially increase volume. 38 However,
the volume of serviceS 39 rendered by physicians and the quality of these
services are not aligned in this model. 40 Third-party payers are
responsible for physician reimbursement and often deny or limit
reimbursement to providers based on the patient's insurance.41 Thus,
payers further incentivize physicians to render as many services as
possible because it is not always clear for which services physicians will
actually receive payment. For example, if a physician sees a Medicare
patient in his or her private practice, it is possible that Medicare will
reimburse only a small fraction of payment, if Medicare reimburses at
all.4 2 This places the provider in a position where he or she must cross-
subsidize43 to break even or make a profit. The pressure to cross-
subsidize pushes physicians to provide as many possible tests and
services to a patient with high-paying insurance or Medicare, as there
is a stronger likelihood of reimbursement with these payers, 44 with no
accountability or requirement for a provider to demonstrate a justified
connection to the healthcare outcomes of that patient.45 In short, the
traditional system results in overutilization.
Misaligned incentives and overutilization in the healthcare
system do not affect only the way providers behave. Imagine a scenario
38. See Steven A. Schroeder & William Frist, Phasing Out Fee-For-Service Payment, 368
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2029, 2029 (2013).
39. Id. "Volume of services" refers to any medical service that can be reimbursed by a payer
and for the purposes of this Note, by Medicare. Under a fee-for-service model, payers reimburse
providers for specific procedures, visits, and surgeries but generally do not reimburse for less
tangible services like coordinated care, patient education, preventative efforts, and public health
initiatives. Institutions and providers often end up bearing the brunt of the cost of these services
and are therefore not financially incentivized to implement these services, despite the fact that
they have been shown to reduce cost and improve the quality of care in the long run.
40. See id. (recommending "a shift from a payment system based on a fee-for-service model
to one based on value").
41. Merrill Matthews, Doctors Face a Huge Medicare and Medicaid Pay Cut in 2015, FORBES
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/merrillmatthews/2015/01/05/doctors-face-a-huge-
medicare-and-medicaid-pay-cut-in-2015/#24a779035c6d [https://perma.cc/XT5N-EB7E].
42. Robert S. Kaplan et al., Intelligent Redesign of Health Care, HARv. Bus. REV. (Oct. 14,
2013), https://hbr.org/2013/10/intelligent-redesign-of-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/CBB3-RD6N].
43. Id. Cross-subsidization in the healthcare industry refers to the practice of offsetting
losses caused by services rendered in a delivery setting that lose money with profit-making services
in order to remain competitive in the healthcare marketplace. Id.
44. Because most low-paying insurers will not cover expensive services, providers will be
minimally reimbursed and may in fact lose money by treating patients with low-paying insurance
like Medicaid patients.
45. Kaplan et al., supra note 42.
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in which a patient has shortness of breath or heart palpitations and
goes to the emergency room, the most expensive place to receive care. 46
This patient is covered by Medicare and will want every single test
possible. 47 The patient is not responsible for the majority of the payment
due to his or her Medicare coverage and will likely not account for the
costs of these procedures when demanding multiple tests.48 Likewise,
the provider will be more than happy to oblige because he or she will be
able to get a larger reimbursement for more tests.49 This perpetuates
an unsustainable system where patients are positioned to demand as
many services as possible, and physicians are incentivized to provide
those services without being held accountable for the quality.50 This, in
turn, drives up costs without necessarily improving outcomes or
increasing efficiencies.
Patient demand for possibly unnecessary services is directly
linked to widespread information asymmetry between providers and
patients. 51 Trust and confidence, along with a mutual understanding
that providers have more knowledge to make decisions with regard to
treatments, referrals, and hospitalizations, have defined the
relationship between providers and patients. 52 Patients, too, have been
unwilling to consider costs when presented with comparable options,
resisting choosing the less expensive, marginally inferior option,53 and
consistently preferring the best care at any cost as opposed to "good
enough" care at a less expensive cost. 5 4 Under the traditional healthcare
model, patients were not required to think about the costs associated
46. See Robin M. Weinick et al., How Many Emergency Department Visits Could Be Managed
at Urgent Care Centers and Retail Clinics, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1630, 1634 (2010) ("Prior studies have
estimated that costs of care at retail clinics and urgent care centers are $279-$460 and $228-$414
less than emergency department costs, respectively, for similar cases.").
47. See WILLIAM JACK, PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH ECONOMICS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 56
(1993) (arguing that the existence of insurance allows many healthcare services to be provided at
low cost, indicating that demand will likely be infinite, or at a minimum extremely high).
48. Id.
49. See Schroeder & Frist, supra note 38, at 2029 (acknowledging that the traditional fee-
for-service healthcare model "contains incentives for increasing the volume and cost of services
(whether appropriate or not)").
50. Id. at 2030; see also Stephen Shmanske, Information Asymmetries in Health Services:
The Market Can Cope, 1 INDEP. REV. 191, 194 (1994) ("If a third party pays all or part of the cost
of additional care, consumers will demand more care than they would otherwise.").
51. See Blomgvist, supra note 24, at 428-29 (asserting that there is "a high degree of
information asymmetry between buyers and sellers" in the healthcare industry).
52. Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics ofMedical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 951 (1963).
53. See Roseanna Sommers et al., Focus Groups Highlight that Many Patients Object to
Clinicians' Focusing on Costs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 338, 339 (2013) (finding "four times as many
negative comments as there were positive ones on the theme of willingness to discuss costs").
54. Id. at 340.
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with healthcare services and felt little responsibility for unsustainable
growth in healthcare spending resulting from expensive and potentially
excessive healthcare.55
Moreover, a knowledge gap exists not only with regard to
medical information, but also with regard to cost information. Patients
are unconcerned with containing systemic costs because discussions
between patients and providers regarding cost rarely take place under
the traditional model.56 Because many providers are often unaware of
the actual prices the hospital may charge, it is possible they do not have
these conversations because they do not have the specific knowledge.
They may not feel compelled to gain this knowledge either, as patients
themselves tend to ignore any cost for which they are not personally
responsible.57 Patients covered by Medicare may not be interested in
learning about the costs of various procedures and care, as they are not
financially responsible.58
B. The ABCs of ACOs
The unsustainable costs of a fragmented healthcare system led
to experiments in healthcare innovation and reform by different
institutions, the government, and insurance companies. 59 ACOs are an
example of an innovative healthcare delivery model that may serve as
a possible solution to the problems existing in the healthcare space.
Different institutions had made efforts to integrate care and implement
value-based reimbursement methods before the introduction of ACOs,
and these efforts informed much of what is seen in the design and
structure of ACOs.60
Before the passing and initial implementation of the ACA in
2010, there was widespread acknowledgment within the healthcare
community that improved clinical integration could lead to better, more
55. Id. at 341.
56. See id. at 344 (discussing the effort "to educate the public about the overuse of tests and
treatments" and the approach "that providers should explicitly discuss the costs of treatments with
patients").
57. James Hardee et al., Discussing Healthcare Costs with Patients: An Opportunity for
Empathic Communication, 20 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 666, 667 (2005).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Vanessa Fuhrmans, Replicating Cleveland Clinic's Success Poses Major Challenges,
WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBi24831191487074451 (last updated July 23, 2009)
[https://perma.cc/YX9K-HR7B] ("[President Obama] has held up [the Cleveland Clinic] as a model
for delivering high-quality and cost-effective health care. But trying to replicate the clinic's
approach . . . would pose difficult challenges.").
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efficient outcomes. 61 The healthcare community, on both an academic
and practical level, began to emphasize aligning financial incentives
with quality, intensified pressure to improve care coordination, 62 and
generated an impetus to eliminate fragmentation in healthcare service
delivery. 63 Despite a widespread understanding by the stakeholders in
the healthcare community of the issues, a complete systemic overhaul
posed numerous difficulties. 64 For many healthcare institutions,
achieving these goals would be extremely difficult due to financial and
operational constraints often associated with providing highly
integrated care, such as technological barriers and advanced data
analytics. 65 However, even before the ACA was enacted, there were
examples of integrated healthcare delivery models that achieved
success by deviating from the traditional fee-for-service model of
reimbursement. 6 6
One example that President Obama held up as a model for high
quality at a low cost is the Cleveland Clinic in Ohio. 6 7 Specific structural
aspects that make the Clinic distinctive include its "being a closed staff,
salaried, group practice" that is "physician-led" and features a "vigorous
annual review process for all physicians and leaders." 68 The Clinic is an
extensive regional clinic that is integrated and consists of a tiered care
delivery system that "provides patients with the appropriate level of
care for each phase of their condition."69 It promoted patient-centered
61. See Ellen Pryga et al., Clinical Integration: The Key to Reform, TRUSTEE, June 1, 2010,
at 2 ("Clinical integration can improve the quality and efficiency of our current health care
system.").
62. See generally NAT'L AcAD. OF SCIS., COMM. ON DIAGNOSTIC ERROR IN HEALTH CARE,
IMPROVING DIAGNOSIS IN HEALTH CARE (Erin P. Balogh et al. eds., 2015).
63. See Thomas Bodenheimer, Coordinating Care--a Perilous Journey Through the Health
Care System, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1064 (2008) (calling for an end to fragmentation and a move
to "care coordination").
64. See id. at 1065-66 (discussing various "barriers to seamless coordination" within the
industry).
65. Thomas C. Brown, Jr., et al., Current Trends in Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions:
Healthcare Reform Will Result in More Consolidation and Integration Among Hospitals, Reversing
a Recent Trent in Which Hospitals Tended to Stay Away from Such Transactions, HEALTHCARE
FIN. MGMT., Mar. 2012, at 114, 115 (discussing how the "municipal bond market" and the notion
that "hospitals are part of the local economy" have both contributed to the failure of hospitals to
consolidate).
66. Id.
67. See Obama, Romney Agree: 'No Debate' that Cleveland Clinic is Great, ADVISORY BOARD
(Oct. 8, 2012), https://www.advisory.com/Daily-Briefing/2012/10/08/Obama-Romney-agree-no-
debate-Cleveland-Clinic-is-great [https://perma.cc/NV2N-GHMX] (highlighting the fact that
Cleveland Clinic was recognized as one of the nation's top health systems across party lines).
68. James K. Stoller, The Cleveland Clinic: A Distinctive Model of American Medicine, 2
ANNALS TRANSLATIONAL MED. 33, 33 (2014).
69. Delos M. Cosgrove, A Healthcare Model for the 21st Century: Patient-Centered, Integrated
Delivery Systems, 80 GROUP PRAC. J. 11, 12 (2011).
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care by consolidating clinical services into patient-centered institutes, 70
created the role of the Patient Experience Officer, 71 and implemented a
Patient Advisory Council for patients to "share ideas on improving the
patient experience." 72 The Clinic has universal data sharing and
requires patient outcomes and procedure costs to be published, shared,
and used to achieve new efficiencies. 73 The Clinic is a group practice
with physician leadership, but with no financial incentives in place for
salaried physicians.74 Because physicians receive only one-year
contracts, the annual performance reviews are used to renew contracts
and ensure the quality of the institution is maintained.75 The design of
the institute structure promotes collaboration and teamwork to solve
complicated problems efficiently. 76
The Cleveland Clinic, and other models like it, provides an
example of a highly coordinated system that achieves great success in
delivering high quality care without waivers from healthcare antifraud
laws.7 7 Unlike traditional healthcare models, the Clinic demonstrates
that focusing on patient-centered care within one integrated network,
performing annual reviews, and removing any connection between
70. See Patient-Centered Medical Home, CLEVELAND CLINIC (2016), http://my.clevelandclinic
.org/services/medicine-institute/patient-centered-medical-home [https://perma.cc/3VZE-5CVJ].
Cleveland Clinic has instituted patient-centered medical homes where patients have a direct
relationship with a team designed to coordinate their care, manage their medications, take
collective responsibility for the totality of care for the patient, and perform follow-up care in the
case of hospitalization.
71. See Office of Patient Experience, CLEVELAND CLINIC (2017), http://my.clevelandclinic.org/
patients-visitors/patient-experience [https://perma.cc/3HYR-BFPD] (describing the role of the
Chief Experience Officer as the head of the Office of Patient Experience and initiatives to improve
the patient experience across the Cleveland Clinic Health System). Specific examples of these
initiatives include same-day access for patients, patient-tracking GPS, integrated Intensive Care
Units and physicians, critical care transport, bed management, and direct, standardized
communication with patients. See Creating a Patient-Centered Healthcare System, CLEVELAND
CLINIC, http://my .clevelandclinic.org/ccf/media/files/redefining-healthcare/patient-centered.pdf
(last visited Jan. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/JJ5X-K4JY].
72. A Model for Healthcare of the Future, CLEVELAND CLINIC, https://my.clevelandclinic.org/
ccf/media/Files/redefining-healthcare/healthcare-future.pdf?la=en (last visited Feb. 27, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/5H57-NNDA] (focusing the Cleveland Clinic's resources on promoting healing
and enhancing the experiences of patients and employees).
73. See Cleveland Clinic CEO: Four Ingredients in Our 'Secret Sauce,'ADVISORY BOARD (Dec.
10, 2012), https://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2012/12/10/cleveland-clinic-ceo-four-
ingredients-in-our-secret-sauce [https://perma.cc/B2EN-QCEA] (sharing an example where
analyzing cost variability of prostatectomies at different hospitals led to improved efficiencies and
a reduction in procedure costs by twenty-five percent).
74. Id.
75. Cosgrove, supra note 69, at 14.
76. Id.
77. See id. (stating that "[t]he Mayo Clinic and Cleveland Clinic, which share the same model
of healthcare delivery, were the two leaders in low-cost chronic care").
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financial reimbursement and the quantity of services performed can
lead to greater efficiencies and improvement in care.78
Models like the Cleveland Clinic, however, cannot be feasibly
implemented everywhere across the country for a number of reasons.
First, there are significant cultural barriers that cannot be easily
changed. 79 For example, many providers are independent and highly
value their autonomy to make decisions regarding the treatment of
their patients and how best to practice medicine.80 Second, because of
the Clinic's unique reputation and numerous international locations,81
it stays profitable by receiving payments from private insurers and
foreign patients who can afford to pay entirely out of pocket, which
generally is not the case for many institutions. 82 Third, there are
significant financial and technological barriers for smaller hospitals to
replicate the level of integration and care of the Clinic.83
In order to address these barriers, many institutions, practices,
and physicians began consolidating to better deliver integrated, high-
quality care at a lower cost. 84 These entities viewed consolidation as the
only way to survive financially and keep up with changing technology.85
ACOs and the idea of "virtual" organizations as the locus for integration
and accountability developed as an alternative to consolidation and as
a means to replicate many of the methods employed by institutions like
the Cleveland Clinic. 86
ACOs aspire to contain costs, deliver higher quality care to
patients, improve access, and correctly align financial incentives for
78. Id.
79. Fuhrmans, supra note 60.
80. See id. (quoting Dr. John Kastor, a medical professor at the University of Maryland,
stating "[p]hysicians don't like others to tell them what to do").
81. See Locations & Directions, CLEVELAND CLINIC (2017), http://my.clevelandclinic.org/
locations-directions [https://perma.cc/9GYP-7NZN] (listing the various domestic and international
locations where the Cleveland Clinic model has been implemented).
82. Id.
83. Fuhrmans, supra note 60.
84. Id.
85. See Bob Herman, Consolidation Could Be Next for Academic Medical Centers, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (July 5, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20140705/MAGAZINE/
307059964 [https://perma.cc/YU2P-6UCP] (arguing that supporting infrastructure changes and
surviving in a cost-cutting environment is difficult to do without consolidation or access to capital).
86. See Elliott Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended
Hospital Medical Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44, w45-w46 (2007), http://content.healthaffairs.org/
content/26/1/w44.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/T28K-R4DM] (exploring an approach that fosters "the
development of accountable care organizations comprising local hospitals and the physicians who
work within and around them"). ACOs, unlike models like the Cleveland Clinic, are not necessarily
found in a specific, physical location and can consist of a virtual organization of providers in
different locations forming one ACO. Id.
748 [Vol. 70:2:737
NO INDUCEMENTS
physicians.8 7 Providers operating in an ACO must "work together to
coordinate care for the Medicare Fee-For-Service beneficiaries they
serve."88 Three essential characteristics of ACOs include (1) managing
and providing a continuum of care for patients across different
institutional settings; (2) prospectively planning budget and resource
needs; and (3) supporting valid, reliable, and comprehensive
performance measurement. 89
ACOs operate under the premise that coordinated care with an
emphasis on preventative medicine helps ensure that patients receive
the "right care at the right time." 90 By focusing attention on
preventative medicine and the totality of care, proponents of ACOs
believe that medical errors can be significantly reduced and that high
cost treatments can potentially be avoided, saving money for the system
and improving overall health outcomes. 9 1 The MSSP helps currently
existing Medicare fee-for-service program providers become ACOs. 9 2 It
was created to coordinate providers and facilitate cooperation to reward
ACOs that lower healthcare costs while simultaneously meeting
performance standards.9 3
ACOs agree to be accountable for health outcomes and the total
experience of care received by patients enrolled in the ACO. 9 4 To qualify
as an ACO under the MSSP, providers must have a patient population
of at least five thousand primary care Medicare beneficiaries to whom
they are responsible for at least three years. 95 Shared savings are then
rewarded to the ACO members based on annual quality metric
outcomes of the specific population.96 ACOs do not necessarily abandon
87. Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice, 29
HEALTH AFF., 982, 982-83 (2010).
88. Summary of Final Rule Provisions for Accountable Care Organizations Under the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. 3 (Mar. 2016),
https://www.cms.gov[Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/sharedsavingsprogram/
Downloads/ACOSummaryFactsheetICN907404.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTS8-CZRR]
[hereinafter ACO Fact Sheet].
89. Devers & Berenson, supra note 16, at 2.
90. ACO Fact Sheet, supra note 88, at 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Medicare Shared Savings Program and Rural Providers, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS. 1 (Mar. 2016), https://www.cms.gov/medicare/medicare-fee-for-service-
payment/sharedsavingsprogram/downloads/aco-ruralfactsheeticn907408.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A8GB-25VU].
94. Id.
95. Erin Bradley, Accountable Care Organizations Antitrust Guidelines Will Not Save Rural
Providers, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 295, 301 (2013).
96. ACO Fact Sheet, supra note 88, at 3.
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the traditional fee-for-service model under Medicare. 97 Instead, they
enter risk-sharing agreements with CMS and receive a portion of any
shared savings obtained by reductions in costS 9 8 associated with the
enrolled population of the particular ACO, 99 as long as they meet the
required quality benchmarks. 100 These risk-sharing agreements can be
one-sided,101 where an ACO will be rewarded for spending below
projected costs, or two-sided, 102 where an ACO can also be penalized for
spending above projections. 103 Under the MSSP, ACOs can choose how
to structure the risk of monetary loss. If an ACO wants a larger part of
shared savings at the end of the year, it can assume a larger portion of
the risk of potentially losing more money, or it can enter a program with
no risk of penalty but will receive a smaller portion of savings.104
ACOs are also required to establish and maintain a governing
body that must include meaningful representation by not just the ACO
participants, but by ACO beneficiaries as well. 105 In order to meet CMS-
defined quality and improvement goals, the ACO governing body must
ensure compliance with evidence-based clinical guidelines.106 Examples
of other requirements include the implementation of an information
technology infrastructure, a physician-directed quality improvement
program, and a written plan for achieving and distributing shared
savings. 107
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id. at 6.
99. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.20 (2011) (defining an enrolled beneficiary as a Medicare beneficiary
who receives at least one primary care service with a date of service during a specified twelve-
month assignment window from a Medicare-enrolled physician who is a primary physician or has
an enumerated specialty designation).
100. Charles B. Oppenheim et al., Accountable Care Organization Final Regulations: Analysis
and Implications, HOOPER, LUNDY & BOOKMAN, P.C. 1 (2011), http://www.health-law.com/media/
news/48_HLB_ACOWhitePaper_-_FinalRule.pdf [https://perma.cclVTL6-Q6DD]; see also 42
C.F.R. § 425.500 (2011) (listing the minimum quality standards an ACO needs to meet in order to
obtain shared savings).
101. 42 C.F.R. § 425.604 (2011).
102. 42 C.F.R. § 425.610 (2011).
103. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 25.
104. Jenny Gold, Accountable Care Organizations, Explained, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept.
14, 2015), http://khn.org/news/aco-accountable-care-organization-faq/ [https://perma.cc/72GL-
5GB6].
105. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.106 (2011) (stating that an ACO governing body must include a
Medicare beneficiary who is (1) served by the ACO, (2) is not an ACO provider or supplier, (3) does
not have a conflict of interest with the ACO, and (4) does not have an immediate family member
who has a conflict of interest with the ACO).
106. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.502 (2011). There are currently thirty-three quality performance
measures across four quality domains: (1) patient/caregiver experience, (2) care
coordination/patient safety, (3) preventive health, and (4) at-risk populations. Id.
107. 42 C.F.R. § 425.112 (2011).
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In order to preserve patient autonomy, patients have the
freedom to choose any provider they wish and are not limited to seeking
care only from providers within the ACO they are assigned to.108 This
presents problems for ACOs concerned with controlling costs and
promoting efficient utilization of services when beneficiaries choose to
seek care from a provider outside of the ACO. ACOs are interested in
retaining the same beneficiaries assigned to their ACO because
monitoring and coordinating care over longer periods of time positions
ACOs to provide better care and reduce costs. 109 Further, ACOs are
accountable for the entire beneficiary population assigned to them. 110
When beneficiaries seek care outside of the ACO network, that care will
still be reflected in the quality measures to which ACO shared savings
are tied."1 Negative quality outcomes or excessive spending on
unnecessary tests will affect the total amount of shared savings split
among ACO providers. 112 Providers are therefore incentivized to keep
beneficiaries within the network because it can affect their bottom line
and the dollar amount reimbursed by CMS.
II. ANTIFRAUD LAWS AND ACOS
This Part analyzes the relationship between existing healthcare
fraud and abuse laws with ACOs. Specifically, it discusses (A) the types
of fraud and abuse that occur in the healthcare industry and the laws
enacted to prevent fraud and abuse from occurring, (B) the Beneficiary
Inducement Prohibition and its enumerated exceptions, and (C) the
expansion of permissible inducements ACOs may use under the
protection of the waiver.
A. Fraud and Abuse in the Traditional Healthcare Model
Following the introduction of Medicare11 3 and Medicaid1 14 as
large governmental payers, poorly aligned incentives resulted in
numerous opportunities for providers and institutions to commit fraud
and abuse. After the implementation of Medicare and Medicaid, the
108. 42 C.F.R. § 425.304(c) (2011).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 4.
111. Id. at 13.
112. Id.
113. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395hhh (2012).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2012).
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government greatly increased spending on healthcare.115 For providers,
obtaining referrals from colleagues became a way to increase the
volume of services rendered and consequently the amount of
reimbursement, which led to providers paying other providers
kickbacks in exchange for referrals. 116 In order to prevent this from
occurring, Congress enacted what is commonly known as the Anti-
Kickback Statute.117 The Anti-Kickback Statute was enacted in order to
prevent individuals from "knowingly offering and receiving any kind of
payment or gift" that induces or influences the generation of healthcare
services or business that can be paid for in whole or part by the federal
government.118 This statute has been interpreted to cover any
arrangement in which "one purpose" of the remuneration was to obtain
money for the referral of services or to induce further referrals.119
As healthcare costs continued to rise in the 1970s and 1980s,
physicians began investing in ancillary services and referring patients
to treatment at facilities in which they had financial interests.120
Studies have also shown that when physicians had ownership interests
in another facility, they were much more likely to refer their patients to
that facility. 121 In response, Congress passed what is commonly known
as the Stark Law. 122 Subject to limited exceptions, the Stark Law
prevents physicians from referring Medicare patients for certain
designated healthcare services to an entity with whom the physician or
115. Corbin Santo, Walking a Tightrope: Regulating Medicare Fraud and Abuse and the
Transition to Value-Based Payment, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1377, 1379 (2014).
116. Id.
117. Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (2012); see also Santo, supra note
115 (recognizing Congress realized the detrimental effects kickback payment arrangements could
have on the long-term solvency of Medicare and Medicaid programs).
118. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2).
119. See, e.g., United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774, 781-82 (7th Cir. 2011) ("We join our
sister circuits in holding that if part of the payment compensated past referrals or induced future
referrals, that portion of the payment violates 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)."); United States v.
McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 834-35 (10th Cir. 2000) ("This court ... holds that a person who offers
or pays remuneration to another person violates the [Anti-Kickback Statute] so long as one
purpose of the offer or payment is to induce Medicare or Medicaid patient referrals."); United
States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68,
72 (3d Cir. 1985) (same).
120. See Santo, supra note 115, at 1379-80 (arguing that physicians offset reimbursement
reductions caused by cost containment measures by investing in laboratory services, diagnostic
imaging centers, medical equipment companies, and outpatient surgery centers and then referring
patients to these entities).
121. See generally Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS OF HEALTH
LAW 15, 16-18 (2011).
122. See Santo, supra note 115, at 1380 (stating that Representative Fortney Stark sponsored
the legislation and that the statute presumes all existing referrals made to entities with physician
ownership interests or compensation arrangements were illegal unless the arrangement satisfied
an existing enumerated exception or an exception later promulgated by CMS).
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his or her immediate family member has a financial relationship. 12 3 If
an entity receives a prohibited referral, it may not bill the Medicare
program for the resulting items and services. 124 In addition to these two
major pieces of legislation, the Civil Monetary Penalties ("CMP")
provisions of the Social Security Act125 and the False Claims Act1 2 6
provided a structural framework to regulate relationships in the
healthcare sector. 127 The CMP provisions include the gainsharing
CMP1 28 and the beneficiary inducement CMP. 1 2 9
These statutes were designed to prevent providers and suppliers
from overusing government healthcare resources, to constrain the
exorbitant spending on healthcare, and to ensure that patients' care is
not influenced by doctors' desires to make a larger profit. 130 However,
as lawmakers began to recognize that these laws stifled innovation in
the healthcare delivery space, exceptions to these laws became more
pervasive. 131 Safe harbor regulations were introduced in order to protect
specific business practices that would not be deemed unlawful or
contrary to the statutory intent of the healthcare fraud laws but that
could easily be textually interpreted to be in violation of these laws.132
123. Limitation on Certain Physician Referrals (Stark Law), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
124. Id.
125. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2012).
126. False Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a) (2012). For the purposes of this Note, the False
Claims Act will not be discussed, as ACOs do not receive waivers from the False Claims Act.
127. Santo, supra note 115, at 1380.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b) (gainsharing CMP). This provision will not be addressed in this
Note. ACOs initially received a waiver. However, the final rule issued in October 2015 deviated
from the interim final rule by no longer waiving the gainsharing CMP. Medicare Program; Final
Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80 Fed. Reg. 66726 (Oct. 29, 2015). At
the time the interim final rule was published, hospitals were prohibited from knowingly paying
providers or inducing providers to reduce or limit services, including medically unnecessary
services. Id. However, the statute has been amended to only prohibiting hospitals from paying
physicians to reduce or limit medically necessary services. Id. at 66726-27. Thus, according to
CMS, ACOs no longer require a waiver from this provision, as the amendment no longer interferes
with the goal of limiting medically unnecessary services. Id.
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2012) (beneficiary inducement CMP).
130. See Santo, supra note 115, at 1394 (describing the motivations behind these statutes).
131. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368, 88368 (Dec. 7, 2016).
132. See Stone & McWhorter, supra note 18, at 14 ("To ensure that certain acts or
arrangements will not be subject to prosecution under the AKS, the OIG has adopted safe harbor
regulations."). Criteria used by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in considering
whether a specified payment practice should lead to the creation of a safe harbor regulation include
(1) an increase or decrease in access to health care services; (2) an increase or decrease in the
quality of health care services; (3) an increase or decrease in patient freedom of choice among
health care providers; (4) an increase or decrease in competition among health care providers; (5)
an increase or decrease in the ability of health care facilities to provide services in medically
underserved areas or to medically underserved populations; (6) an increase or decrease in the cost
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If an act or arrangement complies with one of the safe harbor
regulations promulgated by the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"),
those involved in the act or arrangement will generally "not be
prosecuted or sanctioned."1 3 3 Safe harbors and advisory opinions issued
by the OIG assess the risk of various arrangements that would
otherwise violate existing fraud and abuse laws and give guidance on
more specific situations. 134
B. The Beneficiary Inducement Prohibition
The beneficiary inducement prohibition, included in the CMP
provisions of the Social Security Act, prevents healthcare service
providers from offering or transferring remunerations they "know or
should know" will likely influence a beneficiary's decision to order or
receive services from a particular provider, practitioner, or supplier.135
In order for the statute to be implicated, a person must either act in
"deliberate ignorance" or "reckless disregard" of the truth or falsity of
information and there must be proof of a specific intent to defraud. 136
The requirement that an inducement be related to a specific provider
differentiates the beneficiary inducement CMP from the Anti-Kickback
Law, which requires only a "remuneration to induce beneficiaries to
order an item or service" for the law to be implicated.137
to federal health care programs; (7) an increase or decrease in the potential overutilization of
health care services; (8) the existence or nonexistence of any potential financial benefit to a health
care professional or provider, in which the benefit may vary depending on whether the health care
professional or provider decides to order a health care item or service or arrange for a referral of
health care items or services to a particular practitioner or provider; and (9) any other factors the
Secretary deems appropriate in the interest of preventing fraud and abuse in federal health care
programs. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d (2012).
133. Santo, supra note 115, at 1394.
134. Beneficiary Inducements in an Evolving Market: Assessing the Risks, Understanding the
Benefits, and Drawing the Lines, AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N 5, https://www.healthlawyers.org/
hlresources/PI/ConvenerSessions/Documents/Beneficiary%20Inducements%2OWhite%20Paper
.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) [https://perma.cc/5TMR-5ANU].
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2012). This provision only prohibits inducements to Medicare
and state health care program beneficiaries. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud
And Abuse; Revisions to the Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary
Penalty Rules Regarding Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368 (Dec. 7, 2016).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(7) (defining the term "should know" for the purposes of the
beneficiary inducement CMP).
137. See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 88390 (stating that the beneficiary inducement CMP
would not be triggered "if a hospital were to offer a beneficiary remuneration post-discharge to
follow up with a physician (without regard to who that physician might be, and without
recommending a particular physician or group)").
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In December 2016, the OIG issued a Final Rule expanding the
scope of statutory exceptions to the beneficiary inducement CMP by
amending the definition of "remuneration."1 3 8 Remunerations for all
healthcare providers now include "waiver [s] of coinsurance and
deductible amounts" and "transfers of items or services for free or for
other than fair market value." 139 These exceptions are established by
their explicit exclusion from the definition of remuneration. 14 0 The
amended definition includes an exception protecting "any other
remuneration which promotes access to care and poses a low risk of
harm to patients and Federal Health care programs."141 The OIG
narrowly construes this exception to protect only behaviors promoting
access to care and does not protect inducements "rewarding patients for
accessing care." 14 2 However, some incentives that encourage patients to
actively seek care may be protected under a different exception-the
exception protecting inducements promoting preventive care. 143
Depending on the set of circumstances, the same remuneration can
either trigger the beneficiary inducement prohibition CMP or
completely avoid any implication. 144 In practice, this expansion of
exceptions broadens the tools all providers can use to encourage
patients to take ownership of their own care.
138. Id. at 88369. These enumerated exceptions relate to copayment reductions for outpatient
department services; remunerations that promote access to care and pose a low risk of harm to
beneficiaries; remunerations for certain eligible retailer rewards programs; certain remunerations
to financially needy individuals; and copayment waivers for the first fill of generic drugs. Id. at
88370.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(A-H).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(F). "Care," in the context of "access to care," refers to "access
to items and services that are payable by Medicare or a State health care program for the
beneficiaries who receive them." Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;
Revisions to the Safe Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules
Regarding Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 88391. In order for a remuneration to be
considered "low risk," the remuneration must (1) be unlikely to interfere with, or skew, clinical
decisionmaking; (2) be unlikely to increase costs to federal health care programs or beneficiaries
through overutilization or inappropriate utilization; and (3) not raise patient-safety or quality-of-
care concerns. Id. at 88396.
142. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 88393.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(D).
144. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. at 88391-92.
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C. ACOs: Why Do They Get To Cut in Line?
The restrictive nature of the existing healthcare regulatory
framework posed numerous obstacles for introducing value-based
reimbursement initiatives and other alternative delivery options. The
rigid healthcare regulatory framework, developed to prevent fraud from
occurring in the traditional system, allowed only integrated
organizations to operate under scrutiny from regulatory bodies or
within the confines of a safe harbor. This framework was not designed
to complement value-based, collaborative, risk-sharing delivery
systems like ACOs, but to curb the kind of abuse that ACOs have
arguably been designed to avoid entirely. 145 The fraud and abuse laws
were designed to protect government healthcare programs and
beneficiaries; however, these laws can "act as barriers to incentivizing
the kind of performance and behavior that CMS is trying to get out of
ACOs."1 4 6 Recognizing this, the antitrust agencies, the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), and the OIG allowed ACOs that
met certain criteria to be granted waivers from these laws. 147 Shared
savings and other incentives considered critical to the success of ACOs
violate these laws, so the HHS Secretary therefore found it necessary
to waive certain fraud and abuse laws in order for the goals of the MSSP
to be carried out. 14 8
For example, providers within an ACO are financially integrated
as a result of their contract with CMS and are able to make referrals to
each other, despite this financial relationship. 1 4 9 Financial integration
and collective responsibility for a defined group of patients are the basic
building blocks of ACOs. Thus, an ACO violates the Stark Law by
simply existing. 150 Because of this inherent violation, CMS and the OIG
145. See supra Section II.A.
146. Lisa Schencker, HHS Extends Stark, Anti-kickback Waiver for ACOs, MODERN
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141017/NEWS/
310179934 [https://perma.cc/6E7L-FC6R] (discussing the "underlying tension" between ACOs and
the fraud and abuse statutes).
147. See Medicare Program; Waiver Designs in Connection with the Medicare Shared Savings
Program and the Innovation Center, 76 Fed. Reg. 19655 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011) (seeking public
comment on proposed waivers to ACOs). The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") have issued specific antitrust guidelines regarding ACOs because
of their unique nature, but ACOs do not have an exemption from antitrust law. Statement of
Antitrust Enforcement Policy Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the
Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67026 (Oct. 28, 2011) [hereinafter ACO Antitrust
Policy]; see also supra Part I.
148. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. 66726, 66726 (Oct. 29, 2015).
149. Id.
150. See supra Section II.A.
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allow waivers because they believe the structural design and statutory
requirements of ACOs mitigate the risks financial integration pose. 151
CMS and the OIG recognized that ACOs and their constituent
parts needed flexibility to "pursue a wide array of activities, including
start up and operating activities that further the purposes of the Shared
Savings Program." 152 Without these waivers, ACOs are subject to the
same safe harbors and enumerated exceptions as any other healthcare
organization. The waivers are intended to protect arrangements that do
not fall under a safe harbor or exception, minimizing situations where
ACOs must undergo the case-by-case review process often undertaken
when arrangements are questionable.1 5 3
ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program
currently have waivers 154 from the Stark Law,155 the Anti-Kickback
Statute,1 56 and some provisions of the civil money penalty law,
including the gainsharing CMP15 7 and the prohibition on inducements
to beneficiaries.15 8 The ACA offers additional authority for the HHS
Secretary to waive various fraud and abuse laws for pilot and
demonstration programs, with CMS and OIG responsible for
administering and regulating such waivers.1 59 These waivers have been
fine-tuned since the first proposed rule in November 2011, and the most
recent final rule has been in effect since October 29, 2015.160 The final
existing waivers as of the most recently issued Final Rule are (1) "ACO
151. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. at 66726. CMS and the OIG viewed them as necessary because "providers must integrate
in ways that potentially implicate fraud and abuse laws addressing financial arrangements
between sources of federal healthcare program referrals and those seeking such referrals. Id.
152. See id. at 66726-28 (noting the concerns of stakeholders that the fraud and abuse laws
inhibit incentives necessary for innovative care coordination models to be successful, such as the
provision of EHR systems, IT services, or free care management personnel). It should also be noted
that these waivers only apply to ACOs participating or seeking to participate in the MSSP.
Homchick & Fallows, supra note 19, at 2.
153. Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80 Fed. Reg. at 66739.
154. The authority to promulgate these waivers comes from section 1899(f) of the Social
Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(f) (2012) ("The Secretary may waive such requirements of
sections 1320a-7a and 1320a-7b of this title and this subchapter as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this section.").
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (2012).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5).
159. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
80 Fed. Reg. 66726, 66727 (Oct. 29, 2015) ("The [ACA] includes separate authority for the
Secretary to waive certain laws, including certain fraud and abuse laws, for some other
demonstrations and pilot programs.").
160. See id. at 66726 (describing the dates associated with the waivers).
758 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:2:737
pre-participation" waiver; 161 (2) "ACO participation" waiver; 162 (3)
"shared savings distributions" waiver; 163 (4) "compliance with the
physician self-referral law" waiver; 164 and (5) "patient incentive" or
prohibition on beneficiary inducement waiver.165
The existing safeguard limiting these waivers is that the
"arrangement in question or the use of certain funds be reasonably
related to the purposes of the Shared Savings Program."166 An ACO's
governance body is responsible for making determinations as to
whether an arrangement is "reasonably related" to the purposes of the
MSSP. 16 7 CMS and the OIG expect that the governing body formed by
the ACO will engage in a "thoughtful, deliberative process" when
determining whether an arrangement is reasonably related to "truly
furthering the interests of the ACO as a whole and meeting the
objectives of the Shared Savings Program."168 If an arrangement is
formed and timely review does not follow, this may indicate that the
ACO was "acting for other purposes" and did not make a bona fide
determination. 16 9 It becomes the responsibility of the ACO governing
body to ensure that the arrangements formed are for the purposes of
improving quality outcomes and reducing cost and not to further
161. See id. at 66727-28 (defining "ACO pre-participation" waiver as a waiver of the physician
self-referral law and the federal anti-kickback statute that applies to ACO-related start-up
arrangements in anticipation of participating in the MSSP, subject to limitations that include the
duration of the waiver and the types of parties covered).
162. See id. at 66728 (defining "ACO participation" waiver as a waiver of the physician self-
referral law and the federal anti-kickback statute that applies broadly to ACO-related
arrangements during the term of the ACO's participation agreement under the Shared Savings
Program and for a specified time thereafter).
163. See id. (defining "shared savings distributions" waiver as a waiver of the physician self-
referral law and the federal anti-kickback statute that applies to distributions and uses of shared
savings payments under the MSSP).
164. See id. (defining "compliance with the physician self-referral law" waiver as a waiver of
the physician self-referral law and the federal anti-kickback statute for ACO arrangements that
implicate the physician self-referral law and satisfy the requirements of an existing exception).
165. See id. (defining "patient incentive" waiver as a waiver of the beneficiary inducements
CMP and the federal anti-kickback statute for medically related incentives offered by ACOs, ACO
participants, or ACO providers/suppliers under the MSSP to beneficiaries to encourage preventive
care and compliance with treatment regimes). For the purposes of this Note, "patient incentive
waiver" is used interchangeably with "beneficiary inducement waiver."
166. See id. at 66730; Robert Belfort, A New Fraud and Abuse Paradigm for ACOs: Blurring
the Distinction Between Providers and Payers, 15 Health Care Fraud Rep. (BNA) No. 6, at 274
(Mar. 23, 2011).
167. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. at 66734.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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"individual financial or business interests" of ACO participants,
providers, or suppliers. 170
One of the reasons CMS and the OIG waived the beneficiary
inducement was to prevent patients from seeking care outside the ACO
and to "foster patient engagement in improving quality and lowering
costs."17 1 Supporters emphasize that this waiver is necessary to achieve
better health and better care for Medicare patients. 172 As a result,
Congress authorized the regulatory agencies to waive the prohibition
on beneficiary inducement for ACOs as "ne[cessary] to promote greater
preventive care, to incentivize patients to follow treatments or follow-
up care regimes, and to increase participation in ACOs."1 7 3
In order to receive protection under the waiver, ACOs must
enter into an ACO participation agreement and be in good standing. 174
As with the other healthcare fraud waivers, the item or service being
offered to a beneficiary must have a reasonable connection to the
medical care of the beneficiary. 175 The items or services must be in-kind
and must either be a preventive care item or service or advance
adherence to a treatment regime, drug regime, follow-up care plan, or
management of a chronic disease condition. 176 ACOs, however, are
expressly prohibited from using inducements to reward beneficiaries for
receiving care or remaining in an ACO. 177
Unlike healthcare providers who do not have a waiver of the
beneficiary inducement CMP, ACOs are permitted to use incentives
designed to encourage and reward beneficiaries who seek care.178 For
example, a reward for simply adhering to a treatment plan is
permissible for ACOs who have a patient inducement waiver. In
contrast, this would not be a protected inducement under the "promotes
access to care" statutory exception, unless the remuneration removes
obstacles preventing adherence to a plan or somehow assists the
beneficiary with compliance. 179
170. Id.
171. Id. at 66739.
172. Id. at 66729.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 66743.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 66739.
178. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368, 88394 (Dec. 7, 2016).
179. Id.
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III. PROBLEMS WITH GIVING ACOs
A BENEFICIARY INDUCEMENT WAIVER
By offering "giveaways," providers can distort patient
decisionmaking and can result in inappropriate medical choices and
increased costs.180 Expanding the range of allowable inducements for
ACOs alone can potentially harm competing providers and suppliers
who cannot afford to compete in this manner.181 The corresponding risk
to patients increases as well. 182
A. ACOs Are Financially Incentivized to Retain Patients
The Stark Law prevents physicians from referring Medicare
patients to an entity "with which the physician or an immediate family
member has a financial relationship." 183 The Secretary for HHS waived
this rule for ACOs because ACO providers make referrals to each other,
despite being in the same risk pool and sharing in the same cost savings
annually. 184 However, in order to avoid the pitfalls associated with the
managed care movement, 185 ACOs are required to give patients the
ability to seek providers outside the ACO network, preserving patient
choice. 186 Limiting patients to providers within a specific network can
be restrictive and can lead to frustrated patients who are unsatisfied
with the care they are receiving. 187
Allowing patients to pursue provider options outside the ACO
network gives patients more freedom but poses problems for ACOs
interested in reducing patient turnover. Patient leakage occurs when
patients enrolled in an ACO seek care from providers outside of the
180. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts and Other Inducements to
Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. 55855, 55856 (Aug. 30, 2002).
181. See id. ("The use of giveaways to attract business also favors large providers with greater
financial resources for such activities, disadvantaging smaller providers and businesses.").
182. See id. ("Providers may have an economic incentive to offset the additional costs
attributable to the giveaway by . . . substituting cheaper or lower quality services.").
183. Limitation on Certain Physician Referrals (Stark Law), 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2012).
184. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. 66726, 66737 (Oct. 29, 2015).
185. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Accountable Care Organizations & You: Frequently
Asked Questions for People with Medicare, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2015), https://www
.medicare.gov/Pubs/pdf/11588.pdf [https://perma.cc/32XL-WHG7]; see also Lawton R. Burns &
Mark V. Pauly, Accountable Care Organizations May Have Difficulty Avoiding the Failure of
Integrated Delivery Networks of the 1990s, 31 HEALTH AFF. 2407, 2413 (2012).
186. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 10.
187. See Burns & Pauly, supra note 185, at 2413 (noting that providers in ACOs cannot control
whether patients use out-of-network providers and must rely on persuasion instead).
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ACO.s88 This diminishes an ACO's ability to achieve successful care
coordination at a lower cost for the enrolled population. 189 While only
limited research has been performed, early findings suggest that a
substantial number of ACO beneficiaries do not stay attributed to the
same ACO, and leakage is an extensive problem. 190 ACOs are motivated
to do everything possible to keep patients from "leaking" outside of the
ACO as they are still responsible for all outcomes of patients attributed
to the ACO, with those outcomes affecting the ultimate financial reward
providers receive. 191 ACOs are also responsible for all associated
expenses when an ACO patient receives care outside the ACO. 192
Additionally, if a patient receives the majority of primary care services
from a non-ACO physician, it is possible he or she will no longer be
attributed to the ACO, which can affect an ACO's ability to remain
qualified under the MSSP. 1 9 3
B. Information Asymmetry Leaves Beneficiaries Exposed
The financial motivations tied to preventing patient attrition are
exacerbated by the information asymmetry that exists between
physicians and patients. Physicians, by nature of their professional
medical training, possess information that patients cannot access and
cannot understand. 194 This information is not limited to medical
knowledge-it extends to knowledge of incentives built into the
traditional model along with incentives built into the ACO model.
Patients have no guarantees that physicians will not use "their
informational advantage for personal gain."195 It is unlikely that
patients will question the amount of tests a provider orders for them,
just as it is unlikely that a patient will question why they are being
offered an inducement.196 Personal motivations may lead a physician to
188. Kip Sullivan, Patient Turnover in ACOS Destroys Accountability, PHYSICIANS FOR A
NAT'L HEALTH PROGRAM (June 23, 2015), http://pnhp.org/blog/2015/06/23/patient-turnover-in-
acos-destroys-accountability/ [https://perma.cc/U4ZD-XUSX].
189. McWilliams et al., supra note 26, at 939.
190. See id. at 941 (finding that over one-third of beneficiaries attributed to an ACO in 2010
or 2011 were not assigned to the same ACO in both years).
191. Id. at 943.
192. Lindsy Blazej, Help, My ACO Is Leaking Patients!, LAUNCHMED (July 11, 2014),
http://www.launch-med.com/resources/blog/help-my-aco-is-leaking-patients.html [https://perma
.cc/A7BQ-5NZX].
193. Id.
194. Stephen Shmanske, Information Asymmetries in Health Services: The Market Can Cope,
1 INDEP. REV. 191, 197 (1996).
195. Id. at 198.
196. Id.
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order more tests to receive higher reimbursement, and unless this leads
to higher out-of-pocket costs, patients would have neither the incentive
nor the knowledge to challenge such decisions. 197 Similarly, ACO
providers may take advantage of the relaxed limitations on
inducements and use inducements to keep patients from seeking care
elsewhere.
In order to improve transparency, ACOs are required to publish
data that include general information regarding the ACO,
organizational information, information regarding shared savings or
losses, and the results of patient experience of care surveys and other
claims-based measures.198 CMS also requires ACO providers to inform
patients that the provider may receive an additional financial reward
based on quality and cost outcomes. 199 This disclosure, however, is
reported on the ACO website, and the only other requirement is
notifying beneficiaries of participation in an ACO at the point of care. 200
Patients are often unaware they are even enrolled in an ACO, and many
do not have access to this disclosure or may not understand this
disclosure.201
Publicly providing these details is an important step towards
improving transparency, but falls short of providing patients with
relevant, understandable guidance on how ACOs are structured and the
potential financial incentives that may affect ACO provider behavior.
Numerous barriers still exist for patients. Many patients, especially
elderly patients, are impaired by minimal health literacy.202 Patients
with low levels of health literacy and literacy in general are often
unable to understand disseminated health material that is produced at
a much higher reading level than the estimated average reading level
of the public. 2 0 3 Some patients also have limited access to the
internet, 204 where ACO reporting requirements are published. 205 Many
ACO beneficiaries are unaware that they have even been attributed to
197. Id.
198. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 17.
199. ACO Fact Sheet, supra note 88, at 3.
200. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 17.
201. See supra Section III.A (discussing how physicians naturally have information that
patients can neither access nor understand).
202. Blazej, supra note 192.
203. A.S. Vivian & E.J. Robertson, Readability of Patient Education Materials, 3 CLINICAL
THERAPEUTICS 129, 129 (1980); see also Atul Gawande, Overkill, NEW YORKER (May 11, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/11/overkill-atul-gawande [https://perma.ccV8ZF-
AYX2].
204. Gunther Eysenbach & Alejandro Jadad, Evidence-Based Patient Choice and Consumer
Health Informatics in the Internet Age, 3 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 19, 19 (2001).
205. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 18.
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an ACO and, even worse, some enrolled beneficiaries do not even know
what an ACO is, how it works, or the potential benefits that it can
offer.206 The beneficiary notification requirements for ACOs are
minimal, requiring only notice at the point of care. 207 A simple sign in
the waiting room is sufficient to fulfill this requirement, despite how
insufficient that sign may be at adequately informing patients about
ACOs. 208
Inadequate information dissemination may also be affected by
how closely CMS regulates any marketing materials and activities
performed by ACOs to reach out to patients.209 The definition of what
constitutes "marketing materials and activities" is broad and includes
almost any document used to "educate, solicit, notify, or contact"
beneficiaries or providers about the ACO. 2 1 0 All materials and activities
that fall under this category must be submitted to CMS for approval
before an initial five-day review period beginning on the date of
submission expires. 211 ACOs must stop using or disseminating any
marketing material of which CMS does not approve. 212 The intent
behind this extensive oversight was to protect beneficiaries from
misleading marketing materials.213 However, these strict regulations
on the kinds of materials and activities ACOs can use may prevent
providers from conducting meaningful outreach and from being more
candid with patients about existing financial motivations to keep them
assigned to a particular ACO. 2 1 4 If ACOs need approval from CMS for
every kind of material they want to disseminate, it follows that less
information will be disseminated to patients as a result of such heavy
oversight and control, creating a barrier to meaningful and candid
communication. 215
206. Valerie A. Lewis et al., Attributing Patients to Accountable Care Organizations:
Performance Year Approach Aligns Stakeholders'Interests, 32 HEALTH AFF. 587, 588 (2013).
207. 42 C.F.R. § 425.312 (2011).
208. Id.
209. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 18.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. 42 C.F.R. § 425.310 (2011).
214. Robert Schwartz et al., ACO-Marketing, ABA HEALTH ESOURCE (Aug. 2011)
https://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/publications/aba-health-esource-home/aba
health_1aw _esource_1108_aco.schwartz.html [https://perma.ccV4BU-43D9].
215. See Steven Lieberman, Proposed CMS Regulation Kills ACOs Softly, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(Apr. 6, 2011), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/201 1/04/06/proposed-cms-regulation-kills-acos-softly/
[https://perma.cc/LH4Q-N2F2].
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C. The Underlying Risks Are Not Mitigated by ACO Design
Despite the recent expansion of the universally applicable
enumerated exceptions to the beneficiary inducement prohibition,
ACOs still have much more flexibility to utilize a larger range of
inducements compared to non-ACO providers. 216 Allowing ACOs, and
only ACOs, a waiver from the prohibition on inducing beneficiaries can
create a very unfair situation for providers that compete with ACOs. 2 17
For example, in a rural area where there is an ACO as well as a small
group of providers, it would be almost impossible for the small group of
providers to compete with an ACO that has more resources and the
ability to offer inducements and gifts to patients to keep them within
the ACO network. 218 As ACOs grow in scale and capture larger portions
of geographic market share, they are positioned to disadvantage
smaller providers and businesses by having more leeway to use
"giveaways to attract business."219
Allowing an ACO to induce beneficiaries to prevent "patient
leakage" places non-ACO providers in a difficult situation because non-
ACO providers cannot compete with offerings such as "gym
memberships, personal training sessions, massages or skin creams." 220
In order for an inducement to be permissible, it need only be
"reasonably related"221 to the broad goals of an ACO-however, CMS
does not specifically define this term in the Final Rule and leaves it
broad in scope, creating an uneven playing field for non-ACO
providers.222
Waiving the beneficiary inducement prohibition further
amplifies information asymmetry between providers and patients. The
risks of using inducements to distort patient decisionmaking are just as
present in an ACO as they are in other models, even if these risks
216. See supra Sections IIB, II.C.3 (explaining what is permissible under the statutory
exceptions with what is permissible for ACOs who meet the requirements for the patient
inducement waiver).
217. Id.
218. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts and Other Inducements
to Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. 55855, 55855 (Aug. 30, 2002); see also Erin Bradley, Accountable
Care Organizations Antitrust Guidelines Will Not Save Rural Providers, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 295,
301-02 (2013).
219. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts and Other Inducements
to Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. at 55855.
220. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. 66726, 66739 (Oct. 29, 2015).
221. Id. at 66730.
222. See id. at 66739 (commenting that ACOs should not be given more flexibility beyond
what is currently legally permissible as this "will allow health care professionals not in an ACO to
be on a level playing field with those in ACOs").
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present themselves in another form. 2 2 3 An ACO provider is financially
motivated to induce patients to be seen by another provider within the
ACO because that generates more business for the ACO and allows the
ACO to retain control over the patient's outcomes.224 Overall patient
outcomes are directly related to the amount of shared savings an ACO
receives from CMS and can affect the financial bottom line of ACO
providers. Despite the express prohibition of using items or services to
induce patients to receive care or remain in an ACO, ACOs are
financially incentivized to reduce patient leakage. ACOs can make use
of the much more expansive incentives at their disposal to keep patients
within the network, even if this is not the expressed purpose. While the
Medicare ACO Final Rule states: "[t]he strategies employed by an ACO
to optimize care coordination should not impede the ability of a
beneficiary to seek care from providers that are not participating in the
ACO," providers are incentivized to do exactly that. 2 2 5 The patient
inducement waiver gives ACO providers an additional set of tools to
discourage patients from seeking care elsewhere.
The rationale behind waiving the beneficiary inducement is that
it is required to "promote greater preventive care, to incentivize
patients to follow treatment or follow-up care regimes, and to increase
participation in ACOs." 2 2 6 Without this waiver, ACOs would be
prevented from using "appropriate incentives to help achieve better
health and better care for their Medicare patients."227 The OIG and
CMS view beneficiary compliance with ACO care management
programs as an essential component of the strategy of ACOs to improve
long-term outcomes and focus on preventative care to avoid exorbitant
costs down the line. 22 8
However, this stands in direct contrast with how the OIG has
viewed offering gifts to beneficiaries in the past. 2 2 9 In the past, financial
status and severity of condition did not provide a meaningful enough
223. See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
224. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. at 66730.
225. Heather Punke, Reducing ACO Patient Leakage Begins with Education, BECKER'S HOSP.
REV. (Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/accountable-care-organizations/
reducing-aco-patient-leakage-begins-with-education.html [https://perma.cc/BPB3-WRSJ].
226. Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80
Fed. Reg. at 66729.
227. See id. (using the example that providing a blood pressure cuff for a hypertensive patient
participating in an ACO's chronic disease management program may, depending on the
circumstances, implicate the Beneficiary Inducements CMP).
228. Id. at 66739.
229. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts and Other Inducements
to Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. 55855, 55855-56 (Aug. 30, 2002).
2017] 765
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
basis to allow gifts of value to be given.230 It is not difficult to understand
how inducements can be valuable to beneficiaries with specific chronic
conditions. 231 The recent expansion and clarification of the statutory
exceptions to the inducement prohibition reflect CMS and the OIG's
recognition that there are certain circumstances where inducements
should be permissible. 232 Many Medicare beneficiaries suffer from
chronic conditions, and the government is responsible for paying the
medical bills of the elderly who are often chronically ill.233 Often, these
beneficiaries do not have the financial means to receive additional
services that providers are positioned to offer to make their care easier.
Inducements can promote community and individual awareness of
health risks and resources, promote access to care, improve patient
adherence to treatment regimes, potentially reduce the cost of care,
improve care coordination, engage at-risk populations, and provide
beneficiary education. 234 The patient inducement waiver for ACOs,
however, expands the scope of permitted inducements too far.
In the current healthcare marketplace, the risks of allowing
inducements outweigh the benefits. ACOs are designed to reduce
overutilization of medical services and unnecessary spending in
healthcare. But offering inducements to patients can in fact have
opposite effects. 235 One risk of the patient inducement waiver is that it
can improperly influence patient treatment decisions by offering items
or services of value. 2 3 6 Using inducements to keep patients within the
ACO network can distort a patient's selection of a provider by "shifting
focus to the value of the inducement rather than to the value or quality
of the healthcare services."237 Limiting beneficiary inducements
protects patients from selfish decisionmaking. There is a conflict of
230. Id. at 5.
231. Id. at 2-3.
232. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368, 88370 (Dec. 7, 2016).
233. See Kimberly A. Lochner, Prevalence of Multiple Chronic Conditions Among Medicare
Beneficiaries, United States, 2010, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/ped/issues/2013/pdf/12_0137.pdf [https://perma.cclMX8M-JH2K] (finding 68.4
percent of Medicare beneficiaries had two or more chronic conditions and 36.4 percent had four or
more chronic conditions).
234. Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering Gifts and Other Inducements
to Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. at 55858.
235. Id.
236. Am. Health Lawyers Ass'n Pub. Interest Comm., Beneficiary Inducements in an Evolving
Market: Assessing the Risks, Understanding the Benefits and Drawing the Lines, AM. HEALTH LAW.
ASS'N 4 (Oct. 2013), https://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/PI/ConvenerSessions/Documents/
Beneficiary%20Inducements%2OWhite%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MKB9-9SQ5].
237. Id.
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interest, as individuals associated with ACOs who have clear financial
motivations are responsible for determining whether an arrangement
or inducement is reasonably related to the purpose of the ACO. 238 While
they are required to report the basis on which the determination was
made, it is counterintuitive to have individuals with a financial interest
make this determination.
Giving ACOs the opportunity to induce beneficiaries in ways
that other healthcare competitors cannot gives ACOs an unfair
advantage. 239 Other healthcare providers that do not have the benefit
of being part of an ACO cannot induce beneficiaries in the same way,
and it does not seem equitable that ACOs should have this competitive
advantage in the marketplace. While inducements can be helpful, they
are not the only means by which an ACO can improve care coordination
for patients with chronic illness.240 Improving patient engagement,
introducing health coaches, and developing self-management programs
are examples of strategies that have reliably improved the quality of
care delivered to patients in the absence of inducements or perks. 241
IV. SOLUTIONS TO PROMOTING ACO SUCCESS
This Part proposes alternative solutions to the beneficiary
inducement waiver that can achieve the benefits CMS and OIG desire.
Specifically, this Part will discuss (A) why ACOs should not have a
waiver from the beneficiary inducement prohibition, (B) implementing
shared decisionmaking to help patients better understand their options
while simultaneously strengthening disease-management programs,
(C) reducing information asymmetry between ACO providers and ACO
beneficiaries, and (D) strategizing ways to reduce patient leakage
through meaningful use and analysis of data already collected by the
ACO.
A. Achieving Success Within the Existing Exceptions
ACOs should be required to adhere to the same standards and
safeguards governing other existing integrated healthcare delivery
models with regard to the prohibition on inducing beneficiaries.
Congress, in its recent expansion of exceptions to the beneficiary
inducement CMP with the amendment of the definition of
238. See supra Section I.B.1.
239. See supra Section III.C.
240. See supra Section III.C.
241. See supra Section I.B.1.
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"remuneration," intended to give healthcare providers more flexibility
to "provide efficient, well-coordinated, patient-centered care with
protections against fraud and abuse risks." 24 2 Arguably, the waiver may
have been needed to some extent prior to this expansion, as the existing
exceptions at the time the waivers were developed for ACOs did not
allow as much protection. 243 In light of the recent change, however, the
OIG should no longer afford this waiver to ACOs. In the time between
the Initial and Final Rules for ACO waivers from fraud and abuse laws,
the gainsharing CMP was amended in such a way to render the waiver
unnecessary, and therefore no waiver was finalized. 244 Similarly, the
beneficiary inducement CMP, as amended, gives ACOs more flexibility
to pursue the intended purposes of the Shared Savings Program. The
new exception for activities that are low-risk and promote access to care
can be used alongside other alternative strategies to "promote greater
preventive care, incentivize patients to follow treatments or follow-up
care regimes, and to increase participation in ACOs," without the
increased risks to patients the waiver introduces. 245
It is in the best interest of the healthcare system to minimize the
risk of patients choosing providers or staying within a network because
of a perk. 2 46 While ACOs are given leeway because of their design and
because of their proven success, 247 it is possible for ACOs to achieve the
same success without this waiver. Inducements may initially benefit
patients but they will not lead to the sustainable change and long-term
improvements in healthcare delivery sought by CMS and the 01G.
Instead, ACOs should rely on meaningful patient engagement and self-
management programs, focused education and decisionmaking
initiatives, and data analysis to improve patient retention over
inducing patients with gifts.
242. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368, 88370 (Dec. 7, 2016).
243. See id. (describing exceptions as mechanisms to address the "evolution of healthcare
business arrangements under the fraud and abuse laws").
244. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
80 Fed. Reg. 66726, 66737 (Oct. 29, 2015) (describing the gainsharing CMP as recently amended
to "prohibit a hospital from knowingly making payments to physicians to reduce or limit medically
necessary services," rendering it unnecessary to carry out the purposes of the Shared Savings
program).
245. See supra Section III.C.
246. See supra Section III.B.
247. See supra Section III.C.
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B. Promoting Patient Ownership of Their Own Care
ACOs aim to improve the information gap between patients and
providers and create a care setting where patients can take more
control and be more involved in their own healthcare decisions. 248 One
means of accomplishing this is shared decisionmaking ("SDM"). Under
the traditional model, providers typically determine a course of
treatment without consulting patients. 249 SDM deviates from this by
providing an approach where patients and providers review the existing
evidence together before a treatment decision is made and support is
provided for patients to consider all of their options, as opposed to
accepting whatever option their provider gives them. 2 5 0 ACOs are
already required to incorporate shared decisionmaking principles into
the design of their programs, but the language is very vague and does
not actually require the ACO to engage in SDM practices. 251 Requiring,
or at least encouraging, all ACOs to implement SDM practices can
improve patient adherence to treatment plans and minimize the
information gap between providers and patients.252 For example, ACOs
can regularly employ decision aids. Decision aids are materials that
offer a more detailed and explicit explanation of the specific healthcare
choice a patient faces. 2 5 3
In addition to improving outcomes and containing costs, this
approach effectively aligns with enhancing the overall patient
248. See Judith H. Hibbard et al., Patients with Lower Activation Associated with Higher
Costs; Delivery Systems Should Know Their Patients' 'Scores, 32 HEALTH AFF. 216, 216 (2013)
(defining patient activation as "understanding one's own role in the care process and having the
knowledge, skills, and confidence to take on that role" and noting that patient activation and
patient engagement are interchangeable terms); Julia James, Patient Engagement: People Actively
Involved in Their Health and Health Care Tend to Have Better Outcomes-and, Some Evidence
Suggests, Lower Costs, HEALTH AFFAIRS: HEALTH POLICY BRIEF 5 (Feb. 14, 2013)
http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief id=86 [https://perma.cc/6KSQ-
LS8F] (asserting that patient activation, an interchangeable term with patient engagement, can
be directly linked to improved outcomes and can be used as a measure of patient engagement for
ACOs);.
249. See Glyn Elwyn et al., Shared Decision Making: A Model for Clinical Practice, 5 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 1361, 1362 (2012) (giving reasons providers hesitate to involve patients in
decisionmaking, including that "patients don't want to be involved in decisions, lack the capacity
or ability, might make 'bad' decisions, or worry that SDM is just not practical, given constraints
such as time pressure").
250. Id. at 1361.
251. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.112(b)(2)(v) (2011) (requiring that an ACO engage in "[b]eneficiary
engagement and shared decision-making that takes into account the beneficiaries' unique needs,
preferences, values, and priorities").
252. ADI SHAFIR & JILL ROSENTHAL, SHARED DECISION MAKING: ADVANCING PATIENT-
CENTERED CARE THROUGH STATE AND FEDERAL IMPLEMENTATION 4-6 (2012).
253. Id. at 5.
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experience. While the existing evidence is limited, SDM has shown
promise in enabling patients to take ownership of their own
healthcare.254 The Institute of Medicine's report, Crossing the Quality
Chasm, recommends that SDM principles be included in the redesign
of healthcare delivery moving forward.255 Numerous states have
implemented SDM as part of various policy initiatives and have been
successful. 2 5 6 For example, as far back as 2007, the state of Washington
enacted legislation promoting SDM as a means to improve the existing
informed consent doctrine. 257 In Massachusetts, ACOs must include
SDM in order to be certified by the state.258 SDM processes can be easily
integrated into the ACO structure, providing more opportunities for
patients and providers to collaborate. 259 Healthcare continues to remain
very expensive and, for many before the implementation of ACA,
unattainable. Improving patient engagement, through mechanisms like
SDM, has been associated with reducing costs and improving health
outcomes.260
Chronic diseases remain the most expensive drivers of
healthcare costs and the most difficult to manage, which explains the
emphasis regulatory agencies have placed on improving the
management of chronic conditions like diabetes and heart disease.261
Proper prevention and management of chronic diseases has the
potential to save millions of dollars and substantially reduce incidence
of these diseases. 262 Problems with disease-management result from
noncompliance with treatment plans and critical misunderstandings
between patients and providers on the appropriate ways to manage and
254. Id.
255. Id. at 6.
256. Id. at 9-17.
257. James, supra note 248.
258. Id.
259. SHAFIR & ROSENTHAL, supra note 252, at 22 (recommending that SDM be incorporated
in healthcare delivery system redesign, specifically in ACO requirements, to "reduce the burden of
independent implementation and help integrate the change into the overall change providers are
facing in the healthcare system").
260. Hibbard et al., supra note 248.
261. See Elizabeth Pendo, Working Sick: Lessons of Chronic Illness for Health Care Reform,
YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L., & ETHICS, 453, 453 (2009) (asserting chronic illness imposes significant
costs on the overall economy, accounting for three-quarters of all healthcare expenditures).
262. Ross DeVol & Armen Bedroussian, An Unhealthy America: The Economic Burden of
Chronic Disease-Charting a New Course to Save Lives and Increase Productivity and Economic
Growth, MILKEN INST. (Oct. 1, 2007), http://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/
ResearchReport/PDF/chronicdisease-report.pdf [https://perma.cclLB4H-TXFG]. The Milken
Institute has projected that even reasonable improvements in chronic disease management and
prevention can potentially "avert some 40 million U.S. cases over the next twenty years" and could
translate into savings of "more than $1.1 billion in 2023." Id.
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control chronic illness.263 The patient inducement waiver was intended
to give ACOs more ways to address these issues, specifically by allowing
ACOs to reward patients for seeking or obtaining care, which they
would otherwise be unable to do. 2 6 4 The exception for inducements that
promote access to care, however, still gives ACOs extensive flexibility
to use inducements to remove barriers to access for beneficiaries. 265
While it may be easier to rely on rewards to push patients to
seek treatment or care, patients with truly dangerous chronic illness
need explanation, education, and support.266 Getting a patient to show
up to a doctor's appointment is an important part of the equation, but
quality disease-management comes from understanding the barriers
preventing patients from successfully managing their illnesses. 267 This
simply will not occur without directly communicating with patients and
implementing a support system for that patient. 268 Carefully developed
disease-management programs ("DMPs") are one way to accomplish
this. DMPs are designed for specific groups of patients suffering from
the same chronic illness.269 They are rooted in evidence-based,
coordinated recommendations, which aim to improve the quality of life
for patients, reduce hospitalizations and readmission rates, and
ultimately contain costs. 2 7 0 ACOs can also provide remunerations that
promote access to non-payable care without implicating the beneficiary
263. See Gawande, supra note 203. Dr. Gawande describes an example of a diabetic patient
who underwent a series of expensive tests after a diabetic crisis that confirmed what the medical
staff treating him already knew-that the patient had dangerously uncontrolled diabetes.
However, this did nothing to solve the "core medical problem" of his mismanaged disease. The
treating physician spent forty-five minutes with the patient explaining his condition and how to
treat it and discovered the patient seriously misunderstood when his insulin was required. The
patient was then turned over to a certified diabetes educator who created a personalized plan with
the patient. Id.
264. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
80 Fed. Reg. 66726 (Oct. 29, 2015).
265. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368, 88370 (Dec. 7, 2016).
266. Gawande, supra note 203.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See Stefan Brandt et al., How to Design a Successful Disease-Management Program,
MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Oct. 2010) http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-
services/our-insights/how-to-design-a-successful-disease-management-program [https://perma.cc/
3Z6M-HP6X].
270. Id.
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inducement CMP, such as rewards for accessing food pantries or other
community resources. 271
C. Reducing Information Asymmetry
Often times when confronted with healthcare decisions,
providers give patients more than they can understand. 272 CMS's strict
regulation of patient outreach materials exacerbates these barriers. 273
If the legislative intent behind the MSSP is truly to achieve goals of cost
containment and quality improvement, 274 transparency is necessary
and information should be delivered in a way that patients can
understand. 275 Currently, ACOs can potentially avoid transparency and
still remain in compliance with the requirements of the MSSP if they
report information in a manner that a layperson cannot interpret. 276
ACOs should be required to give accessible and understandable
information regarding specific providers. For example, explaining to
patients the specific benefits of seeing multiple providers within the
ACO rather than seeking care outside of the ACO can reduce reliance
on the use of inducements, while still improving patient retention. An
improved understanding of how an uninterrupted continuum of care
can improve outcomes and the overall patient experience can not only
educate patients but also has the potential to motivate patients to seek
all care within the ACO. If patients have a more comprehensive
understanding of what they can expect from specific providers within
the ACO, they will be in a position to make more informed decisions. 277
Patient engagement is critical to the success of ACOs and is an
important component in the effort to improve care and reduce cost.2 7 8
271. Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revisions to the Safe
Harbors Under the Anti-Kickback Statute and Civil Monetary Penalty Rules Regarding
Beneficiary Inducements, 81 Fed. Reg. 88368, 88391 (Dec. 7, 2016).
272. See Eysenbach & Jadad, supra note 204; see also supra Part II.
273. See supra Section III.A.
274. See supra Part I.
275. See Pauline W. Chen, The Missing Ingredient in Accountable Care, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/health/views/27chen.html [https://perma.ccNB94-
XDGJ] (promoting the idea of providing patients with more information on the quality and benefits
of ACOs using less jargon).
276. See id. (quoting Dr. Meredith Rosenthal, "We aren't using plain English").
277. See Annette O'Connor et al., Toward the 'Tipping Point': Decision Aids and Informed
Patient Choice, 26 HEALTH AFF. 716, 718 (2007) (suggesting that decision aids to help patients
participate in decisionmaking leads to more patient involvement and informed choices "consistent
with [patient] values").
278. Cortney Nicolato, Supporting ACO Success with Meaningful Patient Engagement,
BECKER'S HOSP. REV. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/accountable-care-
organizations/supporting-aco-success-with-meaningful-patient-engagement.html [https://perma
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One possible strategy is to introduce health coaches to motivate
behavior change and help patients create actionable lists that are
personalized and directly related to health goals of patients. 279 It is also
crucial to ensure that patients are aware that they are enrolled in an
ACO and how being enrolled in an ACO can benefit them. 280 This can
be accomplished by strengthening the beneficiary notice
requirement.281 A potential solution to improve transparency between
patients and ACOs is to require a conversation the first time a
beneficiary is seen after being assigned to an ACO that discusses the
way an ACO is structured, the existing financial motivations of ACO
providers to refer within the ACO network, and the added value to the
patient of staying within the ACO network to prevent fragmented
care. 282 Additionally, ACO providers should candidly inform patients
that they have unrestricted freedom in choosing a provider. Similar to
requiring informed consent before a surgery, requiring a patient to sign
a form after such a conversation can improve transparency and allow
the ACO governing body to monitor disclosure to patients.
Another patient engagement strategy that can be used is
developing focused educational initiatives. Educating ACO enrollees
through explicit discussions about the cost of treatments with patients
and the dangers of excessive testing and treatment could help enrollees
understand the true impetus behind cost-containment measures and
the potential long-term benefits of choosing marginally inferior, less
expensive care options. 283 Meaningful patient engagement is associated
with positive changes and care coordination, and it can be successful
without relying on the inducement of patients, as the Cleveland Clinic
model demonstrated. 2 8 4 Improving patient engagement through
.cc/97UC-XADSI; Ross White et al., Why Patient Engagement Is Key to Improving Health, Reducing
Costs, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.brookings.edulblogs/up-front/posts/2014/11/
10-patient-engagement-accountable-care [https://perma.cc/EEN6-ATX7].
279. White et al., supra note 278.
280. See id. (recognizing that many patients are unaware they have been assigned to an ACO
and may seek care elsewhere because not enough attention has been placed on educating the
patient regarding ACO enrollment).
281. O'Connor et al., supra note 277.
282. See Punke, supra note 225 (quoting Dr. Llerena, an ACO provider, stating "[ifl we really
truly feel we offer the best care for those services, then we need to explain to the patient why it
makes sense").
283. See Christine Cassel & James Guest, Choosing Wisely: Helping Physicians and Patients
Make Smart Decisions About Their Care, 307 JAMA 1801, 1801 (2012) (describing the "Choosing
Wisely" campaign that promotes physician and patient conversations about making wise choices
about treatments to reduce unnecessary care and improve the quality of communication between
patients and providers).
284. See Nicolato, supra note 278 (describing a report performed by the Bipartisan Policy
Center that linked patient engagement to fewer referrals, increased adherence to prescribed
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education and outreach can potentially benefit from more relaxed
oversight with regard to the marketing materials ACOs can
disseminate. As discussed, ACOs have significant latitude compared to
other integrated care organizations. 2 8 5 Giving ACOs less oversight with
regard to what educational materials can be disseminated to
beneficiaries can serve as a means of reducing information asymmetry
when it comes to knowledge about the ACO itself.2 8 6
D. Improving ACO Patient Retention Strategies
Increasing patient involvement in the management of care and
reducing the information gap between providers and patients are
alternative ways to address the concerns CMS and the OIG intended to
correct with the patient inducement waiver. However, ACOs already
have many tools at their disposal by virtue of the program requirements
already in place. 2 8 7 ACOs can use the information collected to satisfy
these requirements to strategize ways to achieve the same intended
goals the beneficiary inducement waiver was meant to address.
An ACO is responsible for "routine self-assessment, monitoring,
and reporting of the care it delivers." 288 Monitoring includes "analyzing
claims and specific financial and quality data" as well as regularly
aggregated reports, site visits, and surveys. 289 ACOs can use these data
to analyze factors surrounding patient leakage.290 ACOs also collect
quality and claims data for all assigned beneficiaries, including claims
data of beneficiaries who received care from an outside provider, all of
which are used as part of the annual shared savings calculus. 291 In order
to analyze these data in a way that satisfies the contractual obligations
imposed by CMS, ACOs must implement healthcare technology
medical treatments, increased functional status, faster recovery, and higher levels of satisfaction,
health literacy, and positive health-related behavior changes).
285. See supra Section II.C.
286. Jennifer Bresnick, Three Outreach Strategies to Raise ACO Patient Engagement, HEALTH
IT ANALYTICS (June 15, 2015), http://healthitanalytics.com/news/three-outreach-strategies-to-
raise-aco-patient-engagement [https://perma.cc/UD2K-TR4C] (suggesting that ACO leaders
leverage social media and other online resources to obtain feedback and to provide beneficiaries
with more accessible information about ACOs themselves).
287. See supra Section I.B.
288. ACO Fact Sheet, supra note 88, at 2.
289. Id.
290. See Tricia M. Barrett et al., 10 Things You Need to Know About Accountable Care, INST.
FOR HEALTH TECH. TRANSFORMATION 20 (describing the expectation of HHS that an ACO have the
requisite technology to collect and evaluate data to "provide feedback across the entire
organization, including providing information to influence care at the point of care, feedback from
patient experience, and other quality and utilization assessments").
291. Id.
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infrastructures capable of performing high-level data analytics. 2 9 2
Consequently, ACOs are well positioned to examine trends related to
patient leakage. Upon analysis, an ACO may find that patients in a
certain zip code are seeking non-ACO providers due to geographic
proximity. Rather than relying on inducements to retain those patients,
the ACO can potentially reach out to those specific non-ACO providers
and contract with them. Alternatively, an ACO may find that patients
seeing a specific primary care physician tend to seek specialist care
outside the ACO network. The ACO can work with that primary care
physician to understand why his or her patients are leaving and to work
with the physician to retain those patients through patient engagement
and other quality improvement initiatives.
Analysis of patient leakage will not be difficult for ACOs as they
already collect that data and have the requisite technological
infrastructure to interpret the data.2 9 3 Monitoring provider referrals,
however, is a slightly more difficult task. As violations of the Stark Law
have shown, providers have attempted to get away with abuse of
referral laws in order to gain financial benefits. 294 However, in order to
form an ACO, the Stark Law and Anti-Kickback statutes must be
waived, unlike the beneficiary inducement prohibition. 295 ACOs cannot
function without waivers of the former but can function successfully
without the patient inducement waiver. In an attempt to curb patient
leakage rates and retain control over quality outcomes of assigned
beneficiaries, it is in the provider's singular interest and the ACO's
general interest to keep enrolled beneficiaries in the network. With that
said, however, the regulatory bodies have determined that the financial
incentive of shared savings is mitigated by the design of the ACO and
the quality requirements to which payments are tied.2 9 6 In contrast, the
patient inducement waiver is not mitigated by the design of the ACO.
Rather, the inherent risks of using this waiver for inappropriate
purposes contrary to the intention of the shared savings program and
healthcare reform are increased. 297
292. Oppenheim et al., supra note 100, at 16-18.
293. Id.
294. See Ayla Ellison, 10 Largest False Claims, Stark Law and Anti-Kickback Settlements of
2014, BECKER'S HOSP. REV. (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/legal-
regulatory-issues/10-largest-false-claims-stark-law-and-anti-kickback-settlements-of-2014.html
[https://perma.ccNJF8E-T6G3] (describing the ten largest cases of 2014 that involved violations of
healthcare fraud laws in the United States).
295. See supra Section III.C.2.
296. See supra Section II.B.3.
297. See supra Section III.C.2.
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CONCLUSION
There are many uncertainties regarding the future of the
healthcare system in the United States. Accountable Care
Organizations are one example of a healthcare delivery model that
shifts focus to cost containment and improving the quality of care
delivered to patients. However, it is not a perfect model and is by no
means a model that solves every large issue in healthcare. ACOs should
not be exempt from the prohibition on beneficiary inducements. Rather,
ACOs should focus on improving information asymmetry and
increasing transparency between the ACO and assigned beneficiaries.
Coordinating care in a manner that reduces cost and improves quality
should not rely on inducements-it should result from patient
engagement, transparency, and patient-centered education. Patients
should be making decisions that reflect the best possible medical care
available to them. ACOs are in a position to improve population health
by focusing on creating a patient-centered environment that retains
patients by using meaningful analytics and by educating patients on
why it is in their best medical interest to receive coordinated care. A
patient's decision should be made for medical reasons. While this may
seem like common sense, allowing inducements distorts a patient's
decisionmaking and often results in the patient choosing a provider for
reasons other than the care itself. ACOs are positioned to achieve the
same desired result of improving care coordination and retaining
assigned patients without relying on inducements.
Soraya Ghebleh*
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Vanderbilt University Law School; M.P.H., 2013, The Dartmouth
Institute, Geisel School of Medicine; B.A., 2011, Boston University. I would first and foremost like
to thank the editors and staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for their support, encouragement, and
tireless energy in making this publication possible, especially my editors, Hannah McSween Cole
and Elise Heuberger. I want to thank my colleagues and professors at The Dartmouth Institute
and Professor James Blumstein for sparking my interest in healthcare innovation and always
challenging my notions of what constitutes equitable, quality healthcare. I thank my parents, Pund
and Farid Ghebleh, for their absolute confidence in my abilities and for their unwavering support,
as well as my Irish twin, Seena Ghebleh, who has been my role model in his dedication and pursuit
of the law. Finally, I thank Mike Keskey, for his endless patience, love, and encouragement,
without which this Note would not have been possible.
776 [Vol. 70:2:737
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
2016-2017 EDITORIAL BOARD
Editor in Chief
SUSANNAM. RYCHLAK
Executive Editor
STANLEY ONYEADOR
Senior Articles Editor
LAURA DOLBOW
Articles Editors
MICHAEL BRINKLEY
KYLE D. LYONs-BURKE
ANDREW J. MARINO
KATHERINE E. MARTIN
CLAYTON MASTERMAN
JoHNA. SMITTEN
HANNAH E. WEBBER
PATRICKJ. WEEKS
KASEYYOUNGENTOB
ZOE M. BEINER
JESSICA N. BERKOWITZ
RYAN W. BROWN
CASSANDRAM. BURNS
M. ALEX CARVER
ELIZABETH CHITWOOD
CATHERINE C. CIRIELLO
JACOB T. CLABO
Senior Notes Editor
CLINTONM. BARKER
Notes Development Editor
BENJAMIN D. RAKER
Notes Editors
BRIAN P. BAXTER
ELISE K. HEUBERGER
ABIGAIL E. MOSKOWITZ
ALLENM. THIGPEN
Staff
PAIGE N. COSTAKOS
MONICA E. DION
NICOLE A. DRESSLER
JORDANB. FERNANDES
JESSICA L. HAUSHALTER
KAITLYNO. HAWKINS
R. TURNER HENDERSON
NELL B. HENSON
Senior ManagingEditor
LAURA C. WILLIAMS
Conventions Editor
CARLY A. MYERS
Managing Editors
M. LORA CHOWDHURY
LOREND. GOODMAN
ELLISON G. JOHNSTONE
ERIC C. LYONS
GREGORY M. SERAYDARIAN
CAROLYN E. WEBB
LOGAN R. HOBSON
SAMUEL J. JOLLY
KOURTNEYJ. KINSEL
MIRON KLIMKOWSKI
MORGAN S. MASON
SHANNON C. MCDERMOTI
ALEXANDRA M. ORTIZ
W. ALLEN PERRY JR.
Senior En Banc Editor
HANNAH J. FRANK
En Banc Editors
TIFFANY M. BURBA
JOHNF. KERKHOFF
DEVON L. STRAUSS
HAILEY S. VERANO
Symposium Editor
SORAYA GHEBLEH
Publication Editor
AARON K. ROTHBAUM
DANIELLE J. REID
VICTORIA L. ROMVARY
JULIE L. ROONEY
BENJAMIN H. STEINER
BRADEN M. STEVENSON
NICOLE A. WEEKS
MARGARET G. WILuIN93
JESSICA F. WILSON
BLAKE C. WOODWARD
ADELE M. EL-KHouRI'13
ASHLEY E. JOHNSON'04
Alumni Advisory Committee
RYAN T. HOLT'10, Chair
J. MARIA GLOVER'07
WILLIAM T. MARKS '14
ANDREW R. GOULD'10
ROBERT S. REDER'78
Faculty Advisor
SEAN B. SEYMORE
Program Coordinator
FAYE JOHNSON
VANDERBILT LAW SCHOOL
OFFICERS OF THE UNIVERSITY
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Chancellor of the University; Professor of Law
Susan Wente, Provost and Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs
Audrey Anderson, Vice Chancellor, General Counsel and Secretary of the
University
Jeffrey Balser, Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs and Dean of the School of
Medicine
Beth Fortune, Vice Chancellor for Public Affairs
Anders Hall, Vice Chancellor for Investments and Chief Investment Officer
George Hill, Vice Chancellor for Equity, Diversity and Inclusion and Chief
Diversity Officer
Eric Kopstain, Vice Chancellor for Administration
John M. Lutz, Vice Chancellor for Information Technology
Susie Stalcup, Vice Chancellor for Development and Alumni Relations
Brett Sweet, Vice Chancellor for Finance and Chief Financial Officer
David Williams II, Vice Chancellor for Athletics and University Affairs and
Athletics Director; Professor of Law
LAw SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS
Chris Guthrie, Dean of the Law School; John Wade-Kent Syverud Professor of
Law
Lisa Bressman, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs; David Daniels Allen
Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law
Susan Kay, Associate Dean for Clinical Affairs; Clinical Professor of Law
Spring Miller, Assistant Dean for Public Interest; Lecturer in Law
Kelly Murray, Director, Professional Education; Instructor in Law
Larry Reeves, Associate Professor of Law; Associate Dean & Director, Law
Library
FACULTY
Philip Ackerman-Lieberman, Assistant Professor of Jewish Studies; Assistant
Professor of Religious Studies; Assistant Professor of History; Assistant Professor
of Law
Rebecca Allensworth, Associate Professor of Law
Robert Barsky, Professor of European Studies; Professor of English; Professor of Law;
Professor of Jewish Studies; Professor of French and Comparative Literature;
Chair of the Department of French and Italian; Director of the W.T.Bandy Center
for Baudelaire and Modern French Studies
Margaret M. Blair, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Free Enterprise; Professor of Law
Frank Bloch, Professor of Law Emeritus
James F. Blumstein, University Professor of Constitutional Law and Health Law &
Policy; Professor of Management; Owen Graduate School of Management;
Director, Vanderbilt Health Policy Center
C. Dent Bostick, Professor of Law Emeritus; Dean Emeritus
Michael Bressman, Professor of the Practice of Law
Jon Bruce, Professor of Law Emeritus
Kitt Carpenter, Professor of Economics; Professor of Health Policy; Professor of
Medicine, Health and Society; Professor of Law
James Cheek, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Edward K. Cheng, Professor of Law; Tarkington Chair of Teaching Excellence
William Christie, Frances Hampton Currey Professor of Finance; Professor of Finance;
Professor of Law
Ellen Wright Clayton, Craig-Weaver Chair in Pediatrics; Professor of Pediatrics;
Professor of Health Policy; Professor of Law
Mark Cohen, Justin Potter Professor of American Competitive Enterprise; Professor of
Management; Professor of Law
Robert Covington, Professor of Law Emeritus
Kareem Crayton, Visiting Professor of Law; Founder and Managing Partner,
Crimcard Consulting Services
Andrew Daughety, Gertrude Conaway Vanderbilt Professor of Economics; Professor of
Economics; Professor of Law
Colin Dayan, Robert Penn Warren Professor in the Humanities; Professor of American
Studies; Professor of Law
Paul H. Edelman, Professor of Mathematics; Professor of Law
Joseph Fishman, Assistant Professor of Law
James Ely, Jr., Milton R. Underwood Professor of Law Emeritus; Professor of History
Emeritus
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Professor of Law
Tracey E. George, Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chair in Law & Liberty;
Professor of Law; Director, Cecil D. Branstetter Litigation and Dispute Resolution
Program
Daniel J. Gervais, Professor of Law; Professor in French; Director, Vanderbilt
Intellectual Property Program; Director, LL.M. Program
Leor Halevi, Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
Joni Hersch, Professor of Management; Professor of Law and Economics; Co-Director,
Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alex J. Hurder, Clinical Professor of Law
Sarah Igo, Associate Professor of American Studies; Associate Professor of Sociology;
Associate Professor of History; Associate Professor of Law
Owen D. Jones, New York Alumni Chancellor's Chair in Law; Professor of Law;
Professor of Biological Sciences
Nancy J. King, Lee S. and Charles A. Speir Professor of Law
Russell Korobkin, Visiting Professor of Law; Richard G. Maxwell Professor of Law,
UCLA Law School
David Lewis, William R. Kenan, Jr. Professor of Political Science; Professor of Political
Science; Professor of Law; Chair of the Department of Political Science
Harold Maier 1937-2014, David Daniels Professor of Law Emeritus
Terry A. Maroney, Professor of Medicine, Health, and Society; Professor of Law; Co-
Director, Social Justice Program
John Marshall, Associate Professor of Law Emeritus
William Marshall, Visiting Professor of Law
Larry May, W. Alton Chair of Philosophy; Professor of Law
Sara Mayeux, Assistant Professor; Assistant Professor of Law
Holly McCammon, Professor of Human and Organization Development; Professor of
Law; Professor of Sociology
Thomas McCoy, Professor of Law Emeritus
Timothy Meyer, Professor of Law
Robert Mikos, Professor of Law
Beverly I. Moran, Professor of Law; Professor of Sociology
Alistair E. Newbern, Associate Clinical Professor of Law
Michael A. Newton, Professor of the Practice of Law; Director, Vanderbilt-in-Venice
Program
Robert S. Reder, Professor of the Practice of Law; Partner, Milbank Tweed Hadley &
McCloy (Retired)
Yolanda Redero, Assistant Clinical Professor of Law
Jennifer Reinganum, E. Bronson Ingram Professor of Economics; Professor of Law
Philip Morgan Ricks, Associate Professor of Law
Amanda M. Rose, Professor of Law
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
James Rossi, Professor of Law; Director, Program in Law and Government Program
Edward L. Rubin, University Professor of Law and Political Science; Professor of
Political Science
John B. Ruhl, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor of Law;
Director, Program in Law and Innovation; Co-Director, Energy, Environment,
and Land Use Program
Herwig Schlunk, Professor of Law
Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Centennial Professor of Law
Christopher Serkin, Associate Dean for Research; Professor of Law
Sean B. Seymore, 2015-16 FedEx Research Professor; Professor of Law; Professor of
Chemistry; Chancellor Faculty Fellow
Daniel J. Sharfstein, Professor of Law; Professor of History; Chancellor Faculty
Fellow; Co-Director, George Barrett Social Justice Program
Matthew Shaw, Assistant Professor of Law
Suzanna Sherry, Herman 0. Loewenstein Chair in Law
Jennifer Shinall, Assistant Professor of Law
Ganesh N. Sitaraman, Assistant Professor of Law
Paige Marta Skiba, Professor of Law
Christopher Slobogin, Milton R. Underwood Chair in Law; Professor of Law; Director,
Criminal Justice Program; Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences;
Kevin Stack, Professor of Law; Director of Graduate Studies, Ph.D. Program
in Law and Economics
Carol Swain, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Jennifer Swezey, Assistant Professor of Law; Director, Legal Writing Program
Randall Thomas, John S. Beasley H1 Chair in Law and Business; Director, Law and
Business Program; Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of
Management
Christoph Van der Elst, Visiting Professor of Law
R. Lawrence Van Horn, Associate Professor of Management (Economics); Associate
Professor of Law; Executive Director of Health Affairs
Michael P. Vandenbergh, David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair in Law; Professor
of Law; Director, Climate Change Research Network; Co-Director, Energy,
Environment, and Land Use Program
W. Kip Viscusi, University Distinguished Professor of Law, Economics, and
Management; Professor of Management; Professor of Economics; Co-Director,
Ph.D. Program in Law and Economics
Alan Wiseman, Professor of Political Science; Professor of Law
Ingrid Wuerth, Helen Strong Curry Chair in International Law; Professor of Law;
Director, International Legal Studies Program
Yesha Yadav, Associate Professor of Law
Claire Abely, Instructor in Law
Lawrence Ahern III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Brown & Ahern
Arshad Ahmed, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-Founder, Elixir Capital Management
Richard Aldrich Jr., Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher
& Flom (Retired)
Andrea Alexander, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Samar Ali, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Bass Berry & Sims
Roger Alsup, Instructor in Law
Paul Ambrosius, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Trauger & Tuke
Rachel Andersen-Watts, Instructor in Law
Gordon Bonnyman, Adjunct Professor of Law; Staff Attorney, Tennessee Justice Center
Kathryn (Kat) Booth, Instructor in Law
Linda Breggin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Attorney, Environmental Law
Institute
Larry Bridgesmith, Adjunct Professor of Law; Coordinator Program on Law and
Innovation; Inaugural Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management,
Lipscomb University
Mark Brody, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Seward & Kissel
Henry Burnett, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, King & Spalding
Judge Sheila Jones Calloway, Adjunct Professor of Law; Juvenile Court Magistrate,
Metropolitan Nashville
Robert Cary, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-chair, Legal Malpractice and Ethics Group,
Williams & Connolly
Nicole Chamberlain, Instructor in Law
Jenny Cheng, Lecturer in Law
Jessica Beess und Chrostin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, King & Spalding
William Cohen, Adjunct Professor of Law
Christoper Coleman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Mike Collins, Adjunct Professor of Law
Roger Conner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Special Consultant on Public Service Career
Development
Robert Cooper, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Matthew Curley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
S. Carran Daughtrey, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle
Tennessee District
Catherine Deane, Foreign & International Law Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Diane Di lanni, Adjunct Professor of Law
Patricia Eastwood, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Corporate Counsel, Caterpillar
Financial Services Corporation
Jason Epstein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Nelson Mullins
Anne-Marie Farmer, Adjunct Professor of Law
William Farmer, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Jones Hawkins & Farmer
Carolyn Floyd, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Glenn Funk, Adjunct Professor of Law; District Attorney General, 20th Judicial District
of Tennessee
Jason Gichner, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, Morgan & Morgan
Vice Chancellor Sam Glassock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice Chancellor, Delaware
Court of Chancery
Trey Harwell, Adjunct Professor of Law
Kristen Hildebrand, Instructor in Law
Darwin Hindman III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Shareholder, Baker Donelson
The Honorable Randy Holland, Adjunct Professor of Law; Justice, Delaware Supreme
Court
David L. Hudson, Adjunct Professor of Law
Abrar Hussain, Adjunct Professor of Law; Co-founder and Managing Director, Elixir
Capital Management
Lynne Ingram, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant U.S. Attorney, Middle District of
Tennessee
Marc Jenkins, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate General Counsel & Executive Vice
President-Knowledge Strategy, Cicayda
Martesha Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metropolitan
Nashville Public Defender's Office, 20th Judicial District
Michele Johnson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Tennessee Justice
Center
Lydia Jones, Adjunct Professor of Law
The Honorable Kent Jordan, Adjunct Professor of Law; Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit
Andrew Kaufman, Adjunct Professor of Law
Suzanne Kessler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Of Counsel, Bone McAllester Norton
Kelly Leventis, Instructor in Law
Jerry Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Barrett Johnston Martin & Garrison
Will Martin, Adjunct Professor of Law, General Counsel, FirstBank; Retired Board
Chair, Stewardship Council
Cheryl Mason, Adjunct Professor of Law; Vice President, Litigation HCA
Richard McGee, Adjunct Professor of Law
James McNamara, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Public Defender, Metro
Nashville Public Defender's Office
Bryan Metcalf, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Julie Moss, Instructor in Law; Of Counsel, The Blair Law Firm
Anne-Marie Moyes, Adjunct Professor of Law; Federal Public Defender, Middle
District of Tennessee
Kelly Murray, Instructor in Law
Francisco Miissnich, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Partner, Barbosa Miissnich &
Aragao Advogados
Sara Beth Myers, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Attorney General, State of
Tennessee
William Norton III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bradley Arant Boult
Cummings
R. Gregory Parker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
C. Mark Pickrell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Owner Pickrell Law Group
Mary Prince, Associate Director for Library Services; Lecturer in Law
Eli Richardson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Bass Berry & Sims
Steven Riley, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Brian Roark, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Bass Berry & Sims
Barbara Rose, Instructor in Law
John Ryder, Adjunct Professor of Law; Member, Harris Shelton Hanover Walsh
Deborah Schander, Research Services Librarian; Lecturer in Law
Mark Schein, Adjunct Professor of Law; Chief Compliance Officer, York Capital
Management
Paul Schnell, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flom
Arjun Sethi, Adjunct Professor of Law
Dumaka Shabazz, Adjunct Professor of Law; Assistant Federal Public Defender'
Federal Public Defender's Office
Justin Shuler, Adjunct Professor of Law; Associate, Paul Weiss
Jason Sowards, Associate Director for Public Services; Lecturer in Law
Willy Stern, Adjunct Professor of Law
Casey Summar, Adjunct Professor of Law; Executive Director, Arts & Business
Counsel of Greater Nashville
Judge Amul Thapar, Adjunct Professor of Law; Judge, U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Kentucky
Wendy Tucker, Adjunct Professor of Law; Attorney, McGee, Lyons and Ballinger;
Member, Tennessee Board of Education
Timothy Warnock, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Riley Warnock & Jacobson
Robert Watson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Vice President & Chief Legal Officer,
Metropolitan Nashville Airport Authority
Margaret Williams, Adjunct Professor of Law; Senior Research Associate, Federal
Judicial Center
Justin Wilson, Adjunct Professor of Law; Comptroller, State of Tennessee
Thomas Wiseman III, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Wiseman Ashworth Law
Group
Mariah Wooten, Adjunct Professor of Law; First Assistant Public Defender,
Middle District of Tennessee
Tyler Yarbro, Adjunct Professor of Law; Partner, Dodson Parker Behm & Capparella

